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CHAPTER I
THE THEOLOGICAL EPISTEMOLOGY OF EMIL BRUNNER
Introduction
Ever since the reading ot Emil Brunner's The DivineHuman Encounter this writer has felt the compulsion to delve
more deeply into Brunner's position on the nature and perception or religious truth. 1 This little book, a revised presentation or the 1937 Olaus Petri Foundation lectures, is
certainly one of the reasons that a man like David Cairns
could say that as a theologian Brunner has had a far more
pervasive influence than Barth. 2 Excerpts from this book,
labeled by Dale Moody, "a turning point in the interpretation of truth,"3 and by Paul Tillich, "perhaps his moat
suggestive book,"4 occur in a wide gamut of current theo-

lrt might be well to state at the outset that "religious
truth" in thie study is understood as synonymous with Biblical
or Christian truth. There is no attempt to denote the truth(e)
of some vague religiosity by the use of this term.
2 "The Theology or Emil Brunner," Scottish Journal 2f
Theology, I (1948), 307.
3"An Introduction to Emil Brunner," The Review and
Expositor, XLIV (July, 1947), 326.
4nsome Questions on Brunner's Epistemology," in lli
Theology .2,!: !m!.! Brunner, edited by Charles W. Kegley
(New Yorki Macmillan Co., 1962), p. 99.
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logical writing.

The problem of theological epistemology,5

however, penetrates most ot Brunner•s major writings.

Paul

Jewett ~ays, "In the final analysis, the basic question is
~

the epistemological one tfor Brunner].

How do we know?"6

P. G. Schrotenboer concludes that Brunner•s theology is
"largely a theological epistemology.» 7

Because of Brunner•s

vibrant interest in this subject, his lucid method

or

presen-

tation (in contrast to certain other contemporary European

'

theologians), and his often original and engaging thought
in the a;ea of theological epistemology, thie writer has
chosen his wz•itings for the major field of investigation
for this study.
A concurrent interest in the thought of contemporary

Lutheran theologians in America has motivated the second,
subsidiary field of investigation for this study.

Three

current American Lutheran theologians, Martin Heinecken,
Taito Kantonen and Joseph Sittler, were chosen largely on
the basis ot their contributions and influence in Lutheran
theological circles in America today.

Furthermore, each of

5The term, "theological epistemology," is used in this
study to refer to the primary God-man knovledge relationship,
and not to the discipline of epistemology within the science
of theology.
6Em11 Brunner's Concept of Revelation (London:
Clarke-;iid Co., 1954), p. 1)9.

James

7! ~Apologetics: ·· !!! Analysis §AS Appraisal .9i ~
Eristic Theology st Emil Brunner (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1955),

p. 45.
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them is interested, to varying degrees, in the epistemological problem and its concomitant, the nature of religious
truth.

Heinecken, especially, makes frequent reference to

these issues.
same question:

These men, together with Brunner, all ask the
What is religious or Biblical truth, and hov

can it be known by the individual?

Can religious truth be

"known" by ordinary rational measures, or is a unique epistemology operative when the subject matter is Biblical truth?
This study will attempt to present the answer Brunner gives
to this question and compare with his position the viewpoints
or Heinecken, Kantonen and Sittler.
A study of the various antitheses against which these
men are plying their own theological epistemologies will
shed light on the precise shape and direction they give to
their thoughts in this area.

Also, each man's position on

revelation and on the relationship between reason and faith
will, of necessity, be important corroborative areas of investigation.
The major source materials for this study will include
thirteen of the principal works of Emil Brunner and, with
several minor exceptions, all of the vritin·g s in book or
journal form by Heinecken~ Kantonen and Sittler.

The study

vill be found heavily documented, with frequent direct oitations from the primary sources.

It is hoped that these quota-

tions will be carefully perused.

The aim or this study is to

present Brunner•s position compared with that of the three
Lutherans; the· quotations are an integral part ot this

4
presentation and are being supplied for didactic as well as
documental purposes.
Chapter I of the paper vill deal with Brunner and
Chapter II with Heineoken, Kantonen and Sittler in comparison
to Brunner.

The concluding section will summarize Brunner•s

position, evaluate the oompar:tson made between his positicn .
and that of the three Lutherans, and raise several questions
for further investigation in this field.
The Historical Perspective
The historical and theological phenomenon which, to the
greatest extent, gives rise to the particular theological
epistemology of Emil Brunner is an early begotten end long
lasting doctrinaire intellectualism within the Church and
its theology.

A relationship had become an idea.

God had given place to acceptance of doctrine.

Faith in

The Word who

possesses man had been supplanted by a word which man possesses.
The fides qua creditur had been displaced by the tides guae
creditur.
Brunner saves his heaviest arraignment in this respect
for Orthodoxy, but he sees this misguided intellectualism as
having made its entrance into theological circles as early as
the second century.
From the middle of the aecond century the Church haa
instructed its believers that one "must believe" this
and that doctrine in order to be a Christian--"whoever
wishes to be saved must, above all things, embrace the
Catholic faith." Once 1et ·dogma be the object or faith,
and faith is then determined by means of the ObjectSubject Antithesis, by means or the rational concept

5
of truth, and remains thus~ even though the dogma is
applied as revealed truth.~
Brunner sees the tv~ chief issues in the early Church--the
doctrines of the Trinity and of the two natures of Christ-as being a oase in point.

These issues and the formulations

they engendered were not an unfolding of the apostolic
confession of faith, according to Brunner, but instead, an
ontological oonstruotion which ~irected faith in another
direction than did the

Now

Testament witness to Christ.

Truth to be found in a relationship was being displaced
by truth found in a positive dogma.
According to Brunner, the second century Church, in her
new interest and involvement in doctrinal formulation, did
something which has, since then, always been disastrous in
her history:
she sought for certainties. She created for herself
an instrument of differentiation, which she could use
in a legalistic way; this instrument was the concept
of the divinely inspired, and therefore "infallible"
doctrine.9
In her creeds as well, the early Church gave a dangerous
direction to the living truth or the Word of God.

8 The Divine-Human Encounter, translated by Amandus W.

Loos (Philadelphia:

The Westminster Press, 1943), P• 153.

9 Revelation !J!.S. Reason; The Christian Doctrine 52..!: Faith
and Knowledge, translated by Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: The
Westminster Preast c. 1946), P• 8.
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As the Apostles' Creed by enumeration or a series of
tacts to be believed caused pistis to degenerate into
faith in facts, so by its failure to mention the act
of reconciliation it favoured the wrong development
of dogma along speculative linea.10
The solidification of the early Church's oral tradition and
rule of faith into the canonical Scriptures and the particular creeds would represent to Brunner a dangerous direction
for religious truth.

The truth becomes an object to be

grasped and mastered, rather than a personal address to the
individual.

A living truth to be proclaimed becomes a tact

to be believed.
Unfortunately, the Greek intellectualism which so
early dominated the ecclesiastical view of revelation
obscured this truth from the very outset. The Church
regarded preaching from the point of view of doctrine,
instead of.!.!.£!. versa. Hence the proclamation of the
Gospel--as was the case also with the revelation-was regarded as the communication of doctrine, and
thus as "applied doctrine," in which the personal
address and the "Thou-form" were merely a matter of
form.ll
This exchange of the formulated confession, the "something true," for the living Word of God is a "blight which
lies over the entire history of the Church. 1112

The Reforma-

tion period, limited to the sixteenth century, represented
the one return within the history of the Church to the

10 Emil Brunner, The Christian Doctrine g!: ~ Church,
F a i t h , ~ ~ Consummation. Vol. III of Dogmatics,
translated by David Cairns in collaboration with T. H. L.
Parker (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1962), P• 231.
llBrunner, Revelation~ Reason, P• 149,
l2Brunner, In!. Divine-Human Encounter, P• 119.
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Biblical view ot faith and truth. 1 3

Brunner cannot speak

highly enough of Luther, and throughout his writings he urges
a return to a more "Lutheran" position in these matters.

But

the age of .Orthodoxy consequently lost the ground gained by
the Reformers and lapsed once more into a rigid system ot
guaranteed doctrines to be accepted.

The period of Orthodoxy

receives such a brunt of invective in the writings of Brunner
that this period is treated separately and more fully elsewhere
in this section.
As Brunner sees it, the next great historical perversion
in the area of religious truth and epistemology presented
itself in Rationalism and the Enlightenment.

Whereas previously

the Church had tried to solve the problem of the irrational
character of faith by a "mistaken heteronomy, 11 based, in the
case of Roman Catholicism, on the guarantee for truth offered
from the Vatican, or, in the case of Orthodoxy, on the guarantee
of a doctrine of verbal inspiration, nov Rationalism attempted
the solution by a "mistaken autonomy," a false dependence
on the efforts of the human reason. 1 4 Rationalism denied
that absolute divine truth could be found either in the
Scriptures or the Church, saying that only the "eternal

13

Emil Brunner, I!!!. Philosophy g.!: Religion .!!:2.m, 111!.
Standpoint 2.f. Protestant Theology, translated by A. J. A.
Farrer and Bertram Lee Woolf (Nev York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1937), p. 22.
14Brunner, Revelation ~q Reason, P• 166.

8

truths of reason" are valid. 15

Here the content of religion

can be ascertained independently of any historical phenomena.
Revelation is simply the "last stage of an immanent recollection, an emergence into clear consciousness of what was always
there. 1116 In agreement with Descartes' Cogito, ergo sum, the
Rationalistic conception or truth was that of autonomous truth,
"the identity of the Ego with itself', self-certainty in the
sense of inde pendence of everything which is not myselr.11 1 7
Idealism, with its theory that truth was "mind, reason,
spirit, aubject,» 18 attempted vainly to achieve a synthesis
between Christianity and Rationalism and led instead, by way
of react i on, into a naturalistic materialism.
In the earlier period or the Enlightenment the attempt
was made to represent the Biblical revelation as that
which is essentially rational; in the real _period of
rationalism, on the contrary, revelation no longer had
any meaning; reason was all. Ro mantic Idealism made a
great effort to deepen the concept of reason to such an
extent that it might include within the historical revelation. But the realistic-naturalistic reaction against
Idealism caused this supposed synthesis of Christianity
and rational philosophy, great as it was an intellectual
achievement, to break down; theology confronted-nothing ?19

l5Brunner, Philosophy

16

lll!!•,

2!

Religion, p. 36.

p. 39.

1 7Emil Brunner, I,h!!. ~ and the Horld (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1931), p.°"6s.
18Emil Brunner, Christianity and Civilisation. First
!2.Bndations (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948),
P• 33.

.f!.!:1:

19Brunner, Revelation !.ru! Reason, p. 11.
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In this shift from an idealistic subjectivism to a barren
materialism Brunner sees the main epiotemological problem
for tode.y.
modern spiri·tual evolution has bee-n taking unambiguously the line or a more or less materialistic
objectiviam • • • . In · the sphere or materia·l being
the quantum is the only differentiating factor.
Material being is merely quantitative being.
An
objectivist understanding of truth expresses itself,
therefore, not meroly in terms of practical materialism~
but also in a general quantification of all life • • • • ~o
According to Brunner, each of these systems--whether
heteronomous Orthodoxy or autonomous
Rationalism or · subjec.
.
tivistic 1 Idealism or objectivistic Materialism--have as a
\

common malady the subject-object antithesis.

Either the

emphasis is placed to a mistaken extreme degree on the
object in the faith-knowledge rel~tionship as in Orthodoxy
or Materialism, or on the subject as in Rationalism and
Ideali~m.

Brunner says it was left for the newest form or

philosophy, the existent i al, to question the validity of
the antithesis itselr. 21

In 1947 he said:

Within the last generation we have seen springing up
more or less spontaneously in different areas, and
moving on parallel lines, a series or attempts to
tackle the problem of truth in a new fashion, namely
in such a way that the old opposition of objectivism
and subjectivism no longer plays the dominating
roles.22

20 Christianity gng, Civilisation.

First Part, P• 3 l •

21 The Divine-Human Encounter, P• 82.

---

22

christianity· and Civilisati211.

First Part, P• 34.
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Finding his basis in Martin Luther and in Soren
Kierkegaard (whom Brunner calls "the greatest Christian
thinker of modern timesn 2 3), and profiting from the personalistio theologi9s of Ferdinand Ebner and Martin· Buber, 2 4
Brunner spends a great deal of effort in many of his writings
presenting his own version of theological epistemology.
vill be said of t~is below.

More

But first, Brunner•s chief

"whipping boy" and the subject of his most frequent disparagement, Orthodoxy, must be investigated.
Emil Brunner•s position on theological epistemology can
boat be understood in the light of the antitheses which he
opposes in this connoction.

The antithesis most often attacked

is that of Protestant Orthodoxy with its narrow, impersonal
objectivism and biblicism.
In the centuries immediately following the Reformation,
the recovered Scriptural insights into the personalistic
nature of faith and revelation all but vanished, says
Brunner.
Whilst the Reformation in its centre vas the rediscovery of the non-intellectualiet conception of faith,
this new discovery vas lost all too soon in the fight
against the Roman heresy. The Reformation Churches
became orthodox.25

23 Moody, .2.Ja• cit., P• JlJ.
24Paul King Jewett, "Ebnerian Personalism and its
Influence upon Brunner's Theology," Ih§. Westm1.nster Theological
Review, XIV (May, 1952), 133-34.
25Emil Brunner, Christianitx and Civilisation.

Part:

SEeoitic Problems (New York:

1949), P• 49.

~econd

Charles Scri~ner•s Sons,

ll
As oharacterietice of the period of Orthodoxy Brunner
would include an eprioristio and legalistic view as to the
inspired and infallible nature of the Bible, an attempt at
providing man-made securities for an otherwise faith~based
relation to God, and a displacement of a living interest in
the personal and ethical by an insistence on the precise and
dogmatic.
Jewett notes that Brunn~r's all but universal procedure
is "to trace the curse of Orthodoxy back to one fountainhead,
a belief in the verbal inspiration of the Scripture • •

• •

n26

Apparently without valid internal or external warrant, the
Orthodox fathers had foisted onto the Bible a false and misleading qualification, accord1ng to Brunner.
In orthodox Protestantism an (aprioristic) faith in
the Bible corresponds to this faith in dogma. The
Biblical concept or faith which the Reformers had
rediscovered was replaced by an equally formal
authority, namely the authority of the Holy Book
whose divine inspiration has to be believed "from
the first."27

In so doing, according to Brunner, Orthodoxy bad made of the
Bible's "living present voice cf God" an "independent divine
thing, which just as such, as a corpu~ mortuum, is stamped
with divine authority." 28 This imposition of an infallible
standard onto Scripture has inevitably resulted in a double
concept of faith:

I

faith in the first · place in the Bible's

26lm!l, Brunner's Concept of Revelation, p. 118.
27Brunner, I.rut Christian Doctrine g! iru!. Church, P• 189.
2S!LQ.!:g, and !h.!, World, P• 92.

I
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Christ, and secondly, faith in the Bible as the inerrant
Word of God.

Brunner calls the !.2!!!, scriptura principle

an indefensible supplement to the §ql~ ,l.!9..!. principle and a
stipulation added by post-Reformation theology.29

He says

that this principle, together with an attempted equation of
the Word of God with the word or the Bible, is a product ot
the views of late Judaism. 30 In thus regarding Scripture as
true in itself and as revelation in itself, Orthodoxy has
changed its meaning from "an address made by an act of God"
to a universal truth having the force of law. 31

Orthodoxy

has chang ed a paradoxical and indirect unity between the
word of the Spirit and the word or the Scriptures into a
32
causal and d1rect one, an unapiritual one.
Thus the
materiel principle of Orthodoxy is ultimately a denial of
its formal principle.
For Orthodox faith justification is something to
bal!ave, a truth pronounced by God Himself, a judicial
sentence which at once ~bsolves me ~nd imparts to me
the righteousness of Christ, a correct transaction
before God's court or juetice.33
·
The attempt to convert the historical revelation into a
timeless system of truth has resulted in a dooetic approach

· 29 The, Christi!in, Doctrine .Q..f. 1h!. Church, P• 238.
30Ravelation ~ Reason, p. 127.

31.'.l:.b!. Philosophy ,g,! Religion, P• 34.
32~ . , pp. 33-34.
33Brunner, Ih.!. Divine-Human Encounter, P• 155.
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to Scripture, 3 4 an approach where men attempt to "have" the
Word or God.35
Brunner sees as one of the principal instigations toward
this kind of an objectivistic, legalistic view of God's truth
man's inherent struggle for indigenous securities and
assurances.

He writes:

In the controversy against the Catholic principle of
tradition on the one side, and on the other the
principle of the Spirit of the individualistic
enthusiast together with the newly arising rationalistic principle, the temptation could not be withstood to create a system ot assurance including the
confessional dogma, the notion or verbal inspiration,
and the Bible understood as a book of revealed doctrine.3 6
At another place he says:
for the second time in her history the Church, in her
anxiety to establish security, took a wrong turning •
• • • they returned to the Catholic idea of revelation,
according to which the revelation guaranteed the infallible doctrine contained in Scripture, and the Scripture
guaranteed the divine revelation • • • • 37
In this respect Orthodoxy stood together with even the
most extreme subject1vistic of all systems, mysticism •
• • in both man wants to be the master of truth, he
wants to possess it.n 38 Brunner insists that religious
n

•

truth cannot be "possessed" by man; man can never be its
master.

Man can never "get God in a box."

34.!h1g,., pp. 172, 174.

35rbid., p. 31.
36Ibid., PP• 31-32.
37Revelation end Reason, p. 10.
38Brunner, Word and~ World, P• 76.

Religious truth

14
can only be "known" in the exiatential Divine-human encounter.
God is never to be subjected to a guaranteed system, but is
always Subject •
. Schrotenboer says ·that Brunner's chief complaint against
Orthodoxy is that it is blind to the "dimensional distinction.n39
That is, it treats .1.n the subject-object dimension vhat belongs
in the personal dimension.

Brunner himself writes.s·

'
The significant
factor in Orthodoxy i~ that personal
correspondence was crowded out by a conception ot
truth orientated about the Object-Subject antithesis.
Orthodoxy thought or God as the teacher who delivered
supernatural, revealed truth and proffered faith to
man~ In this way the Word of God was identified with
doctrine, and faith was assent to this doctrine. Precisely that which ia the concern of Biblical faith was
consequently no longer understood: that is, overcoming
the Object-Subject relation and h!~ing the real Person
of God present in ·His Word • • • •

More will be said below regarding the subject-object antithesis and Brunner's suggested personalistic, relational
answer to it.

Suffice it to say here thet Brunner sees

Orthodoxy as having forfeited the entire personalistic emphasis
of the Reformers for the sake or a more rationalistic, doctrinal
approach.
The ethics-minded Brunner furthermore observes a close
relationship between extreme involvement with precision and
flawlessness in doctrinal formulation and a neglect of the
sanctified life and ethics.

39.QJ?..

911.,

"How often does a perfectly

p. 42

40 1'..b!L Divine-Human Encounter, PP• 102-03.
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faultless orthodoxy go with a moral sterility," he warns.4

1

Interest in doctrine more and more arrogates to itself
every other interest; the urge for an ever-nicer precision in the formulation of conceptions--the absence of
which in the whole Bible is so characteristic--becomes
dominant in Church life and leads to endless, even more
subtle, doctrinal controversies. Christian love, practical discipleship atrophies.
Once let faith and
recognition of a system of revealed doctrines become
identical, a nd Christian piety, described in the Bible
as «faith which proves ~ffioaci~us in love," is aeen i~
contra-distinction to doctrine in the clearest and most
definite way.
Caiechetic~l instruction becomes the
preferred and practically the sole means of educating
the younger generation to become Christians. The
thoroughly trained theologian becomes the pattern around
which the fellowship is supposed to orientate itself as
regards the meaning of being a Christian.42
These are the fruits of Protestant Orthodoxy according

to Brunner, fruits which still hamper and even threaten the
life of faith in the Church today.

But these over-emphases

on intellectualism and objectivism, these tendencies toward
the concept rather than the act or the relation, are only
part of a much broader problem--the radical difference between
the Greek and the Biblical concepts of truth and knowledge.
Greek versus Biblical Concepts of Knowledge
It would not be inaccurate to say that Emil Brunner
centers his theological epistemology in the antithesis found
between Greek and Biblical concepts of knowledge.

Greek

thought and meaning is characterized by an immanent, rational,

4 1 The Theology g,! Crisis (New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1931), P• 69.
42Brunner,

Ih!!. Divine-Human Encounter, P• 32.
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abstract principle while Biblical is tranecendant, revelatory
and personalistio. 43

While Greek knowledge is designated by

the general or universal, the timeless and the impersonal,
Brunner says Christian knowledge is just the opposite:
particularistic, historical and . personal.44

Greek philo-

sophical thought is built up around the concept; Biblical
around the story or the event.

B·r unner writes:

The Church has had to pay ~early for the fact that it
substituted the Christian oatechism for the Biblical
histor1, and that it permitted the Greek concept of
knowledge and of truth to take such a dominant place
in its theology. The revelat1on of God must be told,
not taught; the doctrine only has validity as a means
of serving the "telling" of the Good News. Where
narrative is replaced by doctrine, Greek thought triumphs
over the thought of the Bible.45
To present this antithesis in as bold a relief as possible this section will be arranged in antithetical form:
Greek over against the Biblical.

the

Whereas Greek thought is

known by logic and consistency, by the system, Biblical
thought is seen to be paradoxical and a-rational.

The Greek

tradition centers in the idea and abstraction, in reasoning,
while the Biblical tradition has its basis in the concrete
event, · in the historical, in the encounter.

Greek knowledge

is substantialistic; it is interested in the "it," in the
thing.

Biblical knowledge is p~rsonalistic; it is interested

in the "Thou," in the person.

While Greek thought emphasizes

43Brunner, Christianity and Civilisation.

First

.13.!:!,

4 4 ~ a.wi ~ World, p. 18.
45Revelation and Reason, p. 201.
(The emphases in this
quotation, as well~ all other emphases in this study, are
those of the author being quoted.)

P• 65.
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continuity and immanence, Biblical knowledge manifests discontinuity end separation.

In Greek thought man is the disposer,

the autonomy and security seeker; in Biblical thought God is
the Disposer, and in H~m alone is security found.
Paradox is one of the distinguishing features of Biblical
thought according to Brunner:
The Christian Church has knovn from the very first
that what she believes is a stumbling-block and foolishness from the point of view of rational thought.
The object of faith is something which is absurd to
reason, i.e., par~dox; the hall-mark of logical
inconsistency clings to all genuine pronouncements
of faith.46
\.

There can be no knowledge of God but paradoxical knowledge,
says Brunner.47
all paradoxes. 11 4 8

"· • • the assertions of faith are one and
Jewett understands Brunner' s use of the

term "paradox" as having a largely symbolic meaning:
the paradoxical form of words whereby faith expresses
itself constitutes a pointer (Hinweis). The paradoxes
will, 11 by means of conceptual representation, point
to something which lies outside the realm of the conceptual. n49
Related to the above thought, Brunner speaks of a "poetic"
quality inherent in religious language and thought. 50

The

paradox has a fluidity which, like poetry, suggests a variety
of meenings, and a framework of multiple levels of truth.

46!.h~ Philosophy of Religion, p. 55.
47Jbid., p. 95.

48.!lli., p. 96.

4 9 ~ Brunner•s Concept of Revelation, p. 109.
50Ill.!. Christian Doctr~.ne .21: Q.gg,, Vol. I of Dogmatics,
translated by Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: The Westminster
Press, 1950), p. 62.
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To Brunner, like Soren Kierkegaard, the paradox, with all
its contrasts to the sharp and hard edges of academic
theological definition and the neatly hewn and faultlessly
fitted arguments

or

the theological system, is the language

and the epistemological structure of faith-knowledge.
Brunner claims that the whole endeavor of the reason to
unite everything in an all-inclusive system, even if this
system is effected by means of antitheses which are tolerated
for the sake of a synthesis, is futile. 51
Revelation cannot be summed up in a system, not evon
in a dialectical one. A system always implies that
the reason has forced ideas into a certain mould: it
is the "imperialism" of an idea, even when th i s idea
claims to be "Biblica1.n52
Theological deliberation is not meant to be solidified and
finalized by locking it once and for all into a compact,
unified system.

Theological thought has one purpose:

to

be referent to truth existing in another dimension.
The soundness of theological doctrine and ideas
depends upon their direction, upon the singlemindedness with which they point to Him. There
is no closed theological system • • • • 53
Theological formulation, therefore, is not to be an object
of faith, but an index, a director toward an encounter with

God, where faith first becomes possible.

5llh!. Mediator; A Study of !h!. Central Doctrine .2.! !h!.
Christian Faith, translated by Olive Wyon (Philadelphia:
The Westminster Press, c. 1947), P• 107.
52!h!., Christian Doctrine 2f. God, p. 72.
53Brunner, Revelation and

~!.Q.!l,

P• 157.
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Greek speculative thought seeks after the abstract, the
static and the conceptual; Biblical thought is immersed in
the historical and in the truth which happens.
An idea can be detached from its original source.
It is timeless, universally and always true. Christian
faith on the other hand ia concerned with the truth
which we perceive as true for us, not in itself, in
virtue of the bare idea, but only because God actually
utters it: we are concerned with revelation where
everything depends on its having happened.54
Brunner sees as a key to Scriptural truth the passage from
the Gospel according to St. John, "But grace and truth came
by Jesus Christ." 55
God did it.

Truth came into being; it happened.

This is diametrically opposed to the Greek notion

that truth is thnt which is timeless, changeless, and subject
56
to the eterna1.
The truth or which the Bible speaks is always a
happening, and indeed the happening of the meeting
between God and man, an act of God which must be
received by an act of man. The truth acting--this
is the characteristic unphilosophical, non-Greek way
in which the Bible speaks or truth.57
The above quotation presents the very center of Brunner's
position on the nature of religious truth:

truth is

round only in the concrete happening (the existential

54Brunner, The Philosophy .2.!: Religion, pp. 152-53.
55 John 1:17.

56 Brunner, Ih.!. Divine-Human Encounter, P• 140.
57

Ibid., pp. 201-02.
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encounter 58 ); it is a personal meeting between the God who
reveals Himself and man who responds with personal decision;
it is characteristically non-Greek in essence.
Brunner further notes:
Biblical "truth" is as different from what otherwise
is called truth as this personal encounter and the
double-aided self-giving and its resulting fellowship are different from the comprehension of facts
by means of reaaoning.59
It is the difference between kennen and wiesen:
knouledge in two different dimensions.

they are

One is dynamic and

aotualistic; the verb is its chief word.

The other is

substantialietic and impersonal; it centers around the noun.
One is built upon a relation between subject and subject;
the other is baaed on the subject-object split.

One is

achieved only in personal decision; the other is attained
via the intellectualiatic nod.

Brunner calls it "the pre-

judice of modern man" that he so naively presupposes that
there is only one kind of truth, that is, the objective,
impersonal truth which can be proved.
excludes from him all truth which

11

This presupposition

cannot and ought not to

be proved, because it hss to be appropriated in personal

58The term "existential" is used throughout in this
study simply to denote the intense inner awareness of a
man existing coram ~ . There is no attempt to denote
any of the precise philosophical or literary forms which
the existentialist approach has engendered within the past
years.

59 Ibid., p. 75.
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deciaion." 60
While more will be said below concerning Brunner•s
personalism, it should be noted here that he considers
every moving away from the personal "I-Thoun dimension to

the impersonal "I-It" dimension as a move away fro m God's
truth to the truth or the world.
zation," says Brunner.61

"Abstraction is seculari-

The distinction between world-knowledge and Godknowledge--leaving to scientific investigation the
world of facts and reserving for divine revelation
the disclosure of the mystery of God's being, will
and purpose--is not the only revolution which the
Christian faith produces within the concept of truth.
There is a second, just as important. What kind of truth
is it, then, which is revealed to faith? It is not truth
in the sense ot knowing something, but in the sense of a
divine-human, personal encounter. God does not reveal
this and that; He does not reveal a number of truths.
He reveals Himself by communicating Himselt.62
Theology's main concern, then, as over against science
and philosophy, is for a truth which is not an "It," a state
of affairs or a situation.

It seeks a truth which cannot be

known in cool detachment, but only in "the obedience and
confidence of faith." 6 3
The Christian Faith itself is wholly directed towards
Truth; but who would care to maintain that the true
knowledge of faith is scientific knowledge! Science
leads to truth of a quite different kind; the truth

60word and !!l.!. World, p. 62.
61Revelation .!Jl5! Reason, p. 411.
62arunner, Christianity .!!!J!, Civilisation.

First Part,

p. 37.

63Brunner, The Christian Doctrine .2.!: God, P• 63.

of faith is of a wholly different order • • • • The
truth of faith, in the sense in which the Bible uses
the term, is "truth as encounter," truth in the dimension of the person, "Thou-I," but not in the "thing"dimension. The truth which faith perceives and grasps
is a personal self-disclosure, the truth of revelation,
not the truth which can be discovered by research and
the use of the intellect.64
The difference between Biblical and worldly knowledge,
Brunner would say, is the difference between knowing a person
and knowing a fact.

One 1nvolves sharing, communion, deci-

sion; the other stops with intellectual acquaintance and
acceptance.

They are in contradistinot realms.

Greek thought presents a continuum between the human
and the divine.

Although the one is far above the ·other,

still the analogia ent!§. holds true.

The Greek and the

modern mind are united in this respect, says Brunner:

the

Greek mind makes nature the Absolute, and the modern mind
makes the mind or men, history, and the dynamic element the
Absolute.

Botb of them assume, however, a natural means or
rapprochement between man and the Absolute. 6 5 "The rational
man assumes a closed universe, as it were, an unbroken
continuum of truth • • • • n 66

Man by his rational faculties

can achieve divine knowledge.

There is a bridge, and that

bridge is the reason, the intellect.
can conceive

or

The real is as man

it; there is natural, however difficult to

64 !bid., p. 61.
65Brunner, Mediator, p. 116.
66Brunner, The Theology ,2! Crisis, P• 15.
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achieve, access to the divine.

Man c.a n ultimately base his

confidence in himself.
Another vay to express this Greek idea of continuity
in theology ia to speak . of an "imtnanenoe theology."

Here

man finds God in the depth of neture and of his own soul.
Here there is an unbroken unity between God and the natural
existence of man. 6 7
religion of immediacy, be it of the mystical or the
rationalistic or the idealistic type, means that the
necessary presuppositions enabling us to establish the
right relation to God, or to re~ove the obstacle
between ou~ present and the normal co~dition, lie i~
ourselves.b 8
.
Brunner claims that the farther this "process of refraction
of immediacy" goes, the more impersonal and secular knowledge
and truth beoome. 69

The more continuity and directness are

emphasized the more coldl:Y objeoti ve and remote does k'novledge become.

"An impersonal God and an impersonal man are

the necessary and inevitable oonseq~ences of a religion of
1mmanenoe."70

There is no encounter.

There is no communi-

cation with an Other.
But this autonomo~s self-confidence besed on the conviction that man is continuous ~1th God and that God can be
known directly and immediately is s~attered, says Brunner,

67;tbid., p. 29.
~8Emil . Brunner, The Scandal .2£. Christianity (Philadelphia:
The Westminster Press, 1951), p. 22.
69!.b.!. Christian Doctrine .2!:, ·.9..Qs, P• 62.

70Brunner, Ib.!. Theology .Q.!: Crisis, P• Jl.
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folloving an insight or Kierkegaard, by the claim of revelation.

"Thus the stumbling-block or revelation is this:

it

denies that divine truth is a continuation of human thought.
1171 God and God alone causes Himself to be known.
There
• • •
is no valid knowledge of Him apart from His revelation.
God

or

immediacy is never the true God-over-me.

God is never Lord. 1172

The

"A thought-of

More will be said below concerning a

natural knowledge of God; here it is enough to say that
Christianity is based, according to Brunner, on a clear
discontinuity and separation between God and the intellect
of man.
The Greek tradition cannot tolerate a religion that
denies man security within himself.

It cannot allo~ a reli-

gion which throws man totally upon God for his existence.
In fact, Brunner would say that
and highe at attempt

or

0

all rel1g1onn is a "lQ8t

m.a n to find his own security. 1173

Always end everywhere the same tendency to seek
security rises out of man's sinful, anxious nature
and therefore expresses itself wherever men havo
the Churoh.74
Brunner sees man's struggles for security, whether they be
by vay of theological systems or guaranteed dogmatic formu-

lations or an infallible book, as man's basic sin:

7 1 Medietor, p. 108.
72jord gnd the World, P• 25.
73.lli Christian Do·ctrine ·.Q! !!l.!, Church, p, 206.

74The Divine-Human Encounter, p. 26.
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to be autonomous.

He wants to have his ovn assurances, and

these within his own management.

And man's basic fault is

also the basic fault of the Church, says Brunner:
It tthe ChurchJ would like to hold some aesuranoes
in its hend--who could not understand that? It would
like to have in its power or die'posal that in which
lies its stability and its very life. It would like
to ba certain of God in a mor.e direct way than is
guaranteed through . the promise as given to faith
and in prayer.75
Brunne~ sees it as a tttendency of man's spirit and will"
to get truth fnto his power, to try to manipulate i t like an
object at hiA disposal.

Thia same tendency drives man to

try to make the Word of God a disposable object, to seize
the authority or the free divine Word and make it available
in an accleaiaetical system of authority.

76

Knowing, thinking, possessing something is thus, first
of all, something over which I have disposal • • • •
But if the Word of God meets me in faith, this is all
reversed. Then I do not have something like · property
which ia at my disposal, but I myself become property;
then I myself become disposable.77
Whereas natural acquisition of knowledge makes man master over
that vhich he knows and superior to each object of his knowledge,
in revelation the opposite is the case.

"God, through His

revelation, becomes Lord over me; He makes me His
property. 1178

75~.' p. 25.
76IJaid., p. 24.

77~., pp. 87-88.
78Revelation nnd Reason, P• 26.
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The empirical, disposable type of knowledge furthermore
leaves the knower untouched morally; it only adds to his
sinful autonomy.
When I perceive "something," this "something" is then
within me; it becomes, so to say, my possession.
I
embrace it.
In knowing it, I dispose or it. That
which is perceived, that which is known, is at my disposal. The other side of this process is that I myself
am not actually affected by it. My knowledge certainly
enriches me; it may also have influence in my decisions,
on my way of thinking; but it never penetrates to the
core of my person--it does not transform "myself." I
am, after all, the one embracing; I am the possessor.79
This, then, is the sharp antithesis which Brunner sees
between the Greek intellectualist tendency of natural man
and the Biblical obedience-in-trust stance of the man of
faith.

The antithesis is sharp and it is clear.

It is the

decisive element whereby the Christian faith is distinguished
from all other religions and philosophical systems.
The Subject-Object Split and Beyond
The "Object-Subject Antithesis" is Brunner•s most often
used designation for that kind or epistemology which is in
direct contrast to the Biblical.

The antithesis between

object and subject, between the objective truth and the
subjective acceptance or truth, is the basis for an epistemology which has dominated all Western philosophy since
its beginning.

?9The Divine-Human Encounter, P• 87.
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Being and thinking, truth and knowledge--this is
the problem around which philosophical thought has
turned at least since the Sophists and Socrates-a problem that emerges again in Kant's question
about the relation between the "thing-in-itself"
and experience.SO
The subjective knower cooly and with disinterest "h~ndles"
a set of facts.
11

The

11

I" passes objective judgment on the

The tr~th is this and that, a something to be observed,

it."

a quantity to be counted, a datum to be disposed of.

Modern

man, according to Brunner, is "possessed by the idea of
object-truth, thing credulous man, who cannot but think in
terms of quantity, whose eyes are blind to all that belongs
to the sphere of quality.n 81
In this "new knowledge," an integral part of Western
thought, but brought to the fore even in theology by modern
philosophy, the rationalization of science, and modern economic and social life, what in the Bible is meant as expression of faith has come to be understood as the object of
faith.
The Bible speaks about faith being the same as being
in reality allied to Christ; the misunderstanding
replaces the real alliance by the alliance with
Christ as object of faith, as a truth to be
believed.82
This replacement of the personal understanding of faith by
the intellectual is "probably the most fatal occurrence
8
within the entire history of the Church," says Brunner. 3

..!h.!s•, PP• 81-82.
8lchristianity !!!.!! Civilisation.

80Brunner,

First

82The Divine-Human Encounter, P• 154.

!!.!:1,

p. 37.

8 3.!l!!g., P• 154.
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A living relation to a Person has been displaced by an unconcerned acceptance or rejection of a fact.

The subject stands

removed from the object; the subject 1s in control; the subject
is untouched in his inner being.

This is the difference betveen

the general, secular epistemology and the Biblical.

In the one,

religious truth is an object of man's knovledge; it is part of
his rational world, of vhich he is the center. 8 4

In the other

man is confronted by a Person, another Subject, a Thou; truth
is experienced, and only in the personal relationship.

Accord-

ing to Brunner, "The Biblical understanding of truth cannot be
grasped through the Object-Subject antithesis:
it is falsified through it.n 85

on the contrary

There lies an abyss between the

personal subject-Subject relation of faith and the subjectobject antithesis of Western thought.

There is no continuity

between these two epistemologies; they exist in different
dimensions.
Brunner sees a hyper-ccncern for doctrine and theological
instruction as one of the most evident symptoms of this subjectobject antithesis vithin the Church.
the Word alone is efficacious, but doctrine is not-not even Biblical or cateohetical doctrine. When we
consider the Biblical understanding of proclamation,
we observe that it means an event entirely personal,
in the nature of a personal meeting, which is far
different from the catechetical homiletical traffic

8.3 Ibid.,· P• 154.
84Revelation

!J!.4 Reason, P• .366.

85The Divine-Human Encounter, P• 21.
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in dogma which is determined by the Greek concept of
truth.86
Although Brunner himself has written a three-volume dogmatics,
he says this about doctrine:
In doctrine man speaks no ionger in the "Thou"-form
to God--as in the original confession of faith--but
he now speaks about God as "He." Doctrine is no longer
a spontaneous, personal response, in the for.m or
prayer, to the Word or God, but already, even in its
simplest form, it is reflective speech about God.
The process of leaving the sphere or personal encounter
in order to enter into t~e impersonal ~phere of reflection is the presupposition or all doctrine. God is now
no longer the One who speaks, but the One who is spoken
about.87
·
Brunner considers the true and primary purpose of doctrine
to be the expression or confession of faith, not the object
of faith. 8 8

Doctrine is to contain a "minimum of reflection,n 8 9

and is to serve the positive purpose of apologetics.

It is

to be the nsituation" in and through which the personal
encounter with God can take place.
Doctrine standing by itself, separated from the Word of
God as ·the event of encounter, is seen by Brunner as the
essence of legalism.
Whatever the content of this doctrine may be--it may be
even the doctrine of atonement through Jesus Christ and
of justifying faith--so long as it is not God Himself
who speaks with man and while speaking meets him in
fellowship, so long as doctrine confronts him as some-

86 Ibid., p. 176.
87The Christian Doctrine of God, p. 38.
88Revelation and Reason, P• 156.

891h.,! Christian Doctrine of Gqd, P• 39.
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thing taught by the Church or Bible "which one must
believe if he wants to be e Christi-an," his relation
to it remains legal and beers ell the marks of Legalism,
Even Jesus and the grace of God is then law--gemma, the ·
letter.90
Church dogmatism is thus the natural man's legalistic and
ego-directed attempt to avoid the risk of the authentic
obedience-in-trust relation to God.

Where faith or truth
.

.

is understood es an acceptance of doctrines instead of e
Divine-human encounter, says Brunner, self-centered legalism
is the controlling f~ctor.91
There have always been two tendencies competing with
one another throughout the entire history of the Church:
subjectivism and objeotivism. 92

Subjectivism, that urge for

freedom and spontaneity, that w~ll to attain the highest
possible ~evel of self-realization,93 showed itself already
in the primitive Church, and then throughout the entire
course of church history, particularly since the sixteenth
century.

The negation of objective doctrine and form; the

emphasis on conscious states or experience; the ultimate
criterion for the true and the right seen in individual
feeling and appreheneion--all of these subjective tendencies
threatened to undermine the Church at its very foundations,
says B!unner~

To defend itself against . this subjectivity,

and in reaction to it, the early Church and the Church of

90Th~ Divine-Human Encounter, p. 118.
9lchristian!tY and Civilisation.

First

92~ Divine-Human Encounter, p. 21.

ru1, pp. 42-43.
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post-Reformation times built up a system of assurances made
up of objective doctrines.

The timeless, the external, the

detached, the impersonal, the abstract:

these were and are

oharacteriatics ' or this objectivism in the Church.

or

the

two, Brunner sees objectivism as the greeter hazard:
Objeotivism has always been the real ecclesiastical
danger witpin the Church--through all centuries and
even now. · From within the Church its danger is much
more difficult to recognize, and the struggle against
it vas always the most dangerous. For the opponent
will feel himself attacked in his most sacred precinct
and will consider h j mselt called to be guardian on
the battlefield of tho holy treasure entrusted by God
to the Church.94
True religious knowledge end truth is to be found in
neither subjectivism or objectivism, says Brunner.
the m present only half-truths.

Both of

Furthermore, a higher synthe-

sis of these two poles will not arrive at truth either:
There is no right middle way between Objectivism and
Subjectivism: there is no correct mean between two
errors. In this instance too the truth is more
parcdoxical and harder to find.95
Both subjectivism and objectivism are based on the Greek
tradition:

the subject-object •split.

The truth, however,

is not to be found in either subject alone or object alone
according to Brunner.
since neither the subject nor the object is the
ultimate truth, it is inevitable that man's mind
shifts from one pole to the other in an incessant

9 .3 Ib i a • , p • 2 6 •
94.Illl.g_., .pp. 170-71.
95.!ill·· , p. 40.
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pendulum movement. It cannot rest quietly with
either or the alternatives, since neither of them
carries real conviction. This vee~ing from objectivism into subjectivism and back is unavoidable,
because in the long run neither of these two answers ·
to the question of truth is credible.96
I •

Ultimate truth is thus · not found in the "either/or of' objec-

.

tivism and subjectivism."

97

Whether the knowing subject

posits itself es the truth, or whether it posits as truth
its known object--in neither ~see will truth be revealed.
"Thus truth is not to be found either in the object or in.
the subject, but beyond both. · Truth, then, is God Himself
in His self-communication to man. 1198

The subje~t-object split,

the antithesis between knowledge of "something truthful" and

the truth itself, must give way to truth found in a "purely
personal meeting between the accosting God and the answering
man." 99

Religious truth is personal.

Knowledge of religious

truth is not found in a one-sided subjectivism or objectivism;
it is found in relation with the personal God who discloses
Himself to the total person of man.

Accordi.ng to Sohrotenboer,

the best word to doscribe the gulf which exists between subjectobject "it" truth and personal "Thou" truth is the term
"incommensurability." 100 These two types of truth are as
different as ·"the truth which I possess" and "the Truth

96C}')ristianit:y and Civilisation;.

97

·
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which possesses me."lOl

Within the field of human thought in

general, Brunner says, "The discovery of the 'I-Thou' truth
in philosophy by Ebner and Buber is indeed, as Heim has put

it, a 'Copernican turning~point' in the history or thought.nl02
"In the beginning is relation" ia the byword of' Martin Buber. 1 03
"Truth as encounter" is Brunner's version of the same thought. 10 4
Not that knowing which gives man "something," which enriches
his intellect or adds to hie knowledge, but which leaves him
basically unaltered, but that knowing which changes man in
the very core of his person, 10 5 which transforms rather than
educates, which creates fellowship between God and man--thie
is the Biblical concept of truth.
Personalisrn as the Key
The theology of Emil Brunner might appropriately be
called a personalistic theology. 106 In order to appreciate
the implications of this statement, a brief look at personal-

lOlBrunner, Christianity and Civilisation.

p. , ..o.
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1!!.!:1,

l021h.!! Christian Doctrine g.!: Creation and Redemption,
translated by Olive Wyon. Vol. II of Dogmatics (Philadelphia:
The Westminster Preas, 1952), P• v.

l03Martin Buber, ·1 fill!! !h..2..Y,, translated by Ronald
Gregor Smith (Second edition; New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1958), p. 18.

104.I..!l!! Divine-Human Encounter, P• 7.
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106schrotenboer, ~· .£.!i., P• 203.
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ism as a philosophic theory will be helpful.
In philosophy the idea of personality as the foundation of knowledge is developed by such men as Berkeley,
Leibniz, Kant, Hegel and Lotze. 107 In America Bowne,
McConnell, Knudsen and Brightman are leaders in the
personalistic movement. 108 These men are all agreed that the
"immediateness of self-consciousness" is the starting point
of philosophy. 109 Bowne says, "We are in a personal world
from the start, and all our objects are connected vith ·this
110
world in one indivisible system."
Personality is seen · by
these men as "the active ground of the world, and as containing in the mystery of its own unique being the key tf all the
\
antinomies of metaphysics." 111 The conscious personality
ia
both the "supreme value and the supreme reality in the
universe.n 112
This highly idealistic "world of persona" is given being
and meaning and held together by the "supreme person" at its
head.
107R. T. Flewelling, "Personalism," in Encyclopaedia .2.!
Religion !!.!l!! Ethics, edited by James Hastings (Edinburghs
T. & T. Clark, 1956), IX, 771.
108Floyd Hiatt Ross, Personalism and :Y:!..! Problem .2.!
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940), P• 1.

!I!!

109Flewelling, .2R.• cit., P• 771.
llOBorden Parker Bowne, Personalism (Boston:
Mifflin and Company, 1908), p. 25.
lllrlewelling, ~·
Yorki

.211•,

Houghton,

P• 772.

ll2Edgar Sheffield Brightman, Nature !.QS Values (New
Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1945), p. 113.
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Metaphysioall7 it Cpersonalisml is idealistic in the
sense that it olaims the so-called physical world is
a form of spirit having no independent reality, the
direct utterance of God throughout, "the ceaseless
product of the divine energizing," "a mode of the
divine activity • • • without any proper th!nghood,"
things and events being simply "forms of activity"
of the supreme person.113
This "supreme personality" is seen to exist "in and through
the concrete continuous exercise of his personality, thinking, willing and sustaining all things.» 114

The world of

space objects which man calls nature has no substantial
existence in itself, but is merely "the flowing expression
and means of communication" of the supreme person and his
responsive personal beings. 11 5 In the mysteries of the voluntaristic, activistic, causational personality lies the key
to the nature of being, knowledge and truth.
The tendency in secular personalism is to think of
reality in concrete and personal terms rather than in abstract
and impersonal terms,

"To the personalist knowledge exists
only in the concrete." 116 The practical reason takes precedence over the theoretical:

"Not to form abstract theories

but to formulate and understand this personal life of ours
117
is the first and last duty of philosophy."
To the personalist knowledge is gained through experience and through what

ll3R OS S, .2..E.• ~
~~+t. , p • 1 •

114Flewelling, .=
on. cit., p. 771.

115 Bowne, .2..E.• cit., p. 27.
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can be inferred from experience:

"• • • experience is first

and basal in all living and thinking, and all theor.izing must
go out from experience ae its basis, and must return to it
for verification.n 118
The personalistic metaphysics is relational; it is based
on participation and interaction between purposeful, active
individuals. 11 9
Being is implied in the capacity for intelligent
causal action, or in the capacity for being acted
upon. All that exists is the result or manifestation
of a supreme, active, purposive intelligence which creates
and sustains the world of lesser intelligences and
thinga •.120
The personalist thinks in terms of cause rather than substance.
"We owe our being to the divine energy rather then to our
121
possession of a po~tion of the divine substance."
It is difficult to determine exactly what influence this
secular personalism has had on Emil Brunne~.
with many of its tenets ls obvious..

That he agrees

Brunner does acknowledge

the influence of such personalistic philosophers as Martin
Buber and Ferdinand Ebner on his theology. 122 He is undoubtedly not thinking of these ~women, but of the modern
socio-psychological school when he says:

118.Ih!.g_., p. 303.

ll9Ross, ~· ,g,!1., P• 5.

l20Flewelling~ ~· cit., p. 772.
121Albert .Cornelius Knudson, "A Personaliatic Approach
to Theology," in Contemporary American Theology, edited by
Vergilius. J'erm . (New. York: Round Table Press, Inc., 1932),
·1, 238.
.
122The Christian Doctrine_.2.f_!!!.e Church, p. 159.
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No doubt the idea of personality and personal life
plays a large part in the thought of modern thinkers,
but an analysis of this conception or personality
would show that modern man, when he apoaka of person
and the personal, has in mind something which ultima·tely
is quite impersonal, namely, a function within society
and culture.123
Brunner, like the secular personaliets, looks to peisonality
as the k~y to the enigmas or being and truth.

He places

much theological stock in, for example, the relation between
man and wife, as an informative analogy for the rela~ion
be~ween God and man and the W~rd of God and faith~ 124

The

knowledge or faith is directly related to a man's knowledge
of his wife.

It is an experiential, relational, participa-

tive communion rather than an intellectual affirmation of
certain data.
Brunner views reality as divided into the impersonal
and personal, with a graded scale of being encompassing both
dimensions.

Brunner would say, according to Schrotenboer,

that the whole complex of reality in all its parts partakes
of both elements, the personal and the impersonal:

"Neither

the absolutely personal nor the fully impersonal exists anywhere or at any time." 125

Along with Heim, then, Brunner wou1 d

say that even ina~imate nature is "personal" to a certain
extent.

Only the Triune God, says Brunner, is genuinely

personal, for "He is within Himself self-related, willing,

12 3scandal, PP• 73-74.

l24!h!!. Divine-Human Encounter, PP• 90, 162.

125~. cit., p. 195.
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knowing, loving Hi~selr.nl26
The most accurate and illuminating way for man to view
God, Brunner argues is as person:
lle CGod1 is the Other .Qa!, ·the mysterious and
unknowable One, who has his own proper name and whom
we do not know because he is person. Personality is a
secret; a mystery is hidden in it. Knowledge of a person is possible only through revelation, and he reveals
himself through hie word.127
God is seen to be personal, then, in His revelation to man in
Jesus Christ.

"• •• the 'Word' of God, the decisive self-

communication of God, is a Person, a human being, the man in
whom God Himself meets ua."128
The self-revelation of God is no object, but wholly
the doing and self-giving of a aubject--or, better
expressed, a Person. A Person who is revealing Himself, a Person who demands and offers Lordship and
fellowship with Himself • • • • 129
More will be said below with regard to God as Revealer; here
it is enough to say that Brunner uses t~e personalistic category to present not only the nature of God's revelation .but
also the mysteries or the very Godhead itself.
Brunner makes use or the personalistic categories because
he sees a definite relation of similarity between God's being

as person and the being or man as person, a relation which, he

l26Me.,n in Revolt; ! Christian An.t hropologY, translated
by Olive Wyo?1(Philadelphia1 The Westminster Press, 1947),
p. 219.

127~ Theology o f Crisi§, P• 32.
128~ Christian Doctrine gf

9.29., P• 15.

l29The Divine-Human Encounter, P• 75.
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says, "makes the use of such huruan, parabolic language
legitimate."l30

Brunner operates with an activistic rather

than with a substantial concept of person, according to
Schrotenboer:

"A person tto Brunner]

does not refer to an

ontological substance, but is an existontial de~ignation." 1 31
Brunner would consider it fallacious to view man in an
objective, substantial manner.

Man is more than mere empiri-

cal matter; he is spirit.
Man can be person because and in so far as he has
spirit. Personal being is "founded" in the spirit;
the spirit is, so to apeaki the substratum, the
element ot personal being. 32
This "other dimension" of the spirit is the realm of the
personal.

Nothing can be known of this "spiritual," personal

world except one personal spirit disclose itself to another.
We can ourselves find the clue to things; they are
objects, which confront us not in their own selfactivity--making themselves knovn--but as entities
which, by processes of research and thought, we can
learn to understand. But persona are not enigmas
or this kind; a person is a mystery which can be
disclosed only through self-manifestation. In this
self-disclosure alone do we meet this parson as
person; previously he or she is an "object,u a
"something.ul33
Man cannot himself think or a person; a person cannot be a
mere object of his thought.

"A person is that unique being

which discloses itself and therofore enters into my thoughtworld, so to say, as a stranger, affirming itself as an I in

lJO~ Christian Dogtrine .2! Creation, p. 24.
131.Q.Jl •

.£1!..,

P•

30.

l32Brunner, ~.!!!Revolt, p. 237.
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its own right.n 1 34
thought here.

There is no c~ntinuity or immediacy of

lCnowledge of God who is personal comes only

when He speaks to man.
Personality is built upon relatedness.

"To be person
is to be in relation to someone," says Brunner. 1 3 5 What
personality is in the strict sense can be understood only in
confrontation with the personal God.

Because God "calls

me into communion with him, I become in the true sense of
the word a person.« 1 3 6 At least among Christians, there is
no such entity ns a purely isolated person.

"• •• the

spirit is • • • sbove all, and first of all, relatedness to
God, aa He reveals Himself' in His Word. nl'.37
Another term which Brunner uses to describe this relatedness is "personal correspondence."

"• •• all truth is

understood as the ~ruth of a relationship, namely, the relation of perscn~f correspondence between the Word of God and
human obedience-in-trust." 1 38

This personal correspondence,

just the opposite of the subject-object antithesis, is a
matter of relationship in face-to-face encounter between
two subjects, a divine ttThou" and a human "I."

This rela-

133Brunner, Revela.1..!.2Jl !.!!.!! Reason, P• 24.
134arunner, Sganda.l,, p. 41.

135H!Ul, !.!l ~~, p. 221.

l3 6 soandal, p. 75.

137~ !D. Revolt, p. 239.
138!h!t. Divine-Human Encounter, p. 201.
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tionship is logically unsatisfying, incongruous, and annoying
to the desire for intellectual investigation, 1 39 but within

it, and within it alone, is real religious truth assimilated
by man.

When mania accosted faoa-to-face by God who demands

a decisive answer to His revelation; when man accepts and fulfills his God-given gift of responsibility as a personal being;
when man answers God with obedience-in-trust--then man truly
becomes a person, a proper pole in the personal correspondence
between God and man.
For decision is the essence of personality. Only
when man comas to a crisis and is compelled to choose
between life and death does he become a personality.
At the very moment when God challenges him to mako
his decision man is given peraonality.14_0
In this relationship, then,

or

decisive responsibility over

against the revelation of God man discovers who he is and what
truth is and who God is.

Emil Brunner•s theological epista-

mology is built upon this personalistic premise.
God as Revealer
Jewett remarks, "· • • there can be no adequate understanding of what Brunner thinks about Christianity as a whole,
apart from an understanding of his concept
particular.n 1 41

or

revelation in

Brunner h i mself says:

139.I.lu..g,., P• 1 24.

140The Theology£!: Crisis, pp. 30-31.

l4l!D!!l Brunner's Concepi 21: Revelation, p. 1.
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Hero tin !..h!. Djvine-Humon Eneounterl I placed the
biblical understanding of truth over and against the
Greek understanding which ·iu the foundation of our ·
Western phi.losophy and science. Since then, all my
work in dogmeties hes been done in the light cf this
aspect: the God who communicates himself. As a result
of thia, the old concept of revelation vas freed from
ita intellectual misunderstanding and the basic connection between knowledge and ·communion c&ma to h~ve its
rightful place. In this I see my rnost important contribution to the theological concept of knovledge.142

It would be impossible to understand Brunnar's theological
epistemology without investigating his doctrine of revelation,
and for this reason:

for Brunner, true knowledge of things

religious 1~ only attained in communion with the God who
discloses Himself.

God does not stand at the end of a long

line or deductions or abstract speculation.

Man does not

know God unless and until He addresses him personally.
nThrough God alone can God be known."l43
Due to the fact that many studies have already b0en made
specifically on Brunner's ccnoept of revelation, 1 44 and also,
because a.n adequate treatment of this matter would entail
more than a full-length thesis itself, the writer has chosen
to state Brunner•s doctrine of revelation in somewhat cursory
form.

Much has already been said above with regard to Brunner's

views on revelation; here only the high points of his position
will be presented.
l42The Theolo~l of Emil Brunner, edited by Charles W.
Kegley, p. 12.
l43Brunner, Medietor, p. 21.
~

144sae, for exampla, Paul Jewett•s excellent analysis,
Brunner's ConoeRt 2f Revelation, which is quoted above.
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A,

God Himself is the absolute Subject of revelation.

God is prima~y, creative and without presuppositions. 1~+ 5
Even as He reveals Himself to man, His Word "never becomes
our word; the word of .Q.Y.£ soul, but remains the Word of
6
God." 1 4
Brunner says that God as Subject interrupts the
"monologue or our thought of God, of our mystical feeling
for Godn 1 47 and remains the Subject - of the communication
throughout.

God never becomes an object of thought, but is

always the Subject who shares Himself with subjects.
But if it is true, as faith knows it to be true, that
God's word ia the truth, it means that truth--absolute,
ultimate, final truth--is not "something" that I can
know as an object opposite men, neither is it reasoa
or spirit, my knowing mind, but it is the divine Thou
who, in His own initiative, discloses Himself to me.
True, God is over against me, yet He is no object,
but spirit. True, He is spirit, but not my spirit;
He is . the absolute subject, which I am not.148
1
Even in His ~evelation and because of it; 4 9 God as
absolute Subject remains unknowable and mysterious to man.
"The better we know God, the more we know and feel that His
Mystery is untathomable. 111 50

Outside of His self-e;ommunication

God as Person and Subject remains an absolute mystery;

l'-1
J

within the context of His self-disclosure in Jesus Christ

145Brunner, The Divine-Human Encounter 1 p. 49.

ll.,6Brunne r,

~

ui the

Worl4, P• 80.

l~ a runner, Christianitz §Ag, Civilisation,

147Ibid., P• 23,.
First Part,

p. 39.

149Brunnar,

'l'ha

Christian Doctrine Q.! 9.2.g,, p. 118.

1 .. 0
' l!?.!.g,. , p. 117.

15larunner, ~ and 1h.!, World,· P• 24.
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this mystery is by no means resolved, but rather thereby tirst
comes into its own as myetery. 152 Here at least man catches
a glimpse of the full mystery or the nature and purpose or

God.

All the while, however, God is absolute Subject or the

epistemological relationship.

B.

God discloses Himself through a personal address

to the respondent.

As in an encounter between two human

beings person-to-person, God makes Himself accessible to
the believer.
to faith.

He communicates Himself, not a "something,"

As a result, the believer no longer has an object

to be pondered and discussed as in purely rational effort,
but a "Person who Himself speaks and discloses Himself.nl53
To the question of what God reveals to man, Brunner answers,
"Not merely does He reveal His will-to-communion with us,
His creatures; He reveals
Himself, His very essence as Love,
I
1

as self communicating Life."

154

That Brunner's . Christology is closely intertwined with
\

his concept or revelation is at once apparent.

In His reve-

lation, God gives man Himself, and He gives man Himself in
I

the person of Jesus Christ. ' "Revelation here means the Word
or God as a human person." 155

In Jesus Christ God's reve l a-

tion becomes p~rsonal and 1t· becomes direct.

l5 2 Sohrotenboer, .Q.Jl•

s!i•,

P• 36.

153Brunner, Ill!. Divine-Human Encounter, P• 85.
154christianity and Civilisation.

F i r s t ~ . P• 38.

155Brunner, Word and !h.! World, P• 21.
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Since God's revelation is a disclosure, not of "something," but of Himself, it comes to man in the form of a
direct encounter, a personal address.
No longer is it a question or the insertion or
something into the knowledge I possess, the expansion
of the intellectual riches at my disposal; but it is
answering personally when addressed • • • • 156
It is one Person lovingly communicating His heart to another
person.

c.

Only through His revelation can God be known.

The absolutely Mysterious is not only partially hidden
from the natural knowledge of man; it is wholly inaccessible to man's natural faculties for research and
discovery.157
The God who is conceived by thought is an "intellectual idol,"
says Brunner. 1 58
CGod in His revelation1 bursts through and destroys
all the fundamental categories of thought: the absolutely antithetical cha racter of the basic logical
principles of contradiction and identity.159
This viewpoint that a knowledge of God exists only in so
far as there is a self-disclosure or revelation has profound
implications for Brunner 1 s epistemological position.
edge or God and or His "things" is given to man.

The knowl-

The selt-

oentered circle of man's unbroken continuity is broken down.
"The truth comes in its own way and in its own power, to you.

156Brunner, I!!.! Rivine-Human Encounter, P• 89.
157Brunner, Revelation~ Reason, P• 23.
158l:lll! Christian Doctrine g.!: God, P• 136.
159Revelat1on and Reason, PP• 46-47.
160The Christian Doctrine g.!: Q.ru!, P• 125.
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You do not possess it, it is not in you, it is given to you.n 1 60
"God is known only where He Himself makes His Name known,"
161
says Brunner.
Not through thought, nor conclusions drawn
from the structure of the universe, nor· meditation on the
nature of the Spirit; 162 but only as He speaks to a man
personally and reveals His S•lf can God be known and
experienced.

This knowledge through revelation is always

a gift of the Self-giving God, and it is always unexpected. 163
Man cannot knov the things of God by his own efforts.
!

D.

The revelation of God is historical revelation.

In the "higher" relation to God of speculation and
mysticism, in the »religion of educated people,"
revelation means rather the emergence of the eternal
basis of all phenomena into consciousness, the perception. of something which was always true, the growing
consciousness of a Divine Presence, which might have
been perceived before, since it was there all the
time.164

.

In Christianity--and here lies the stumbling-block, says
Brunner--revelation iD "connected with a fact that took
16
Place Once and for ...~11 • • . • n 5 l1natural man ~ants a
~

religion of immediacy, of timelessness, ,on universality.
Natural man is scandalized by this insistence on the
historical, the given.

"• , • to Reason there is no greater

161 Ibid., p. l 20.
162Revelation ~

· Reason, P• 44.

163Ibid., p. 29.
164Brunner, Mediator, P• 22.

165 Ibid., p. 42 •
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absurdity than to assert that for us the divine truth is an
isolated fact, that it is disclosed to us in one single event.11166
But, as Brunner writes, "Christianity is either faith in the
revelation of God in Jesus Christ or it is nothing."l67 · With
the unrepeatable, given, once-for-all, historical person of
Jesus Christ "all theological statements about the divine
revelation must begin • • • •"168
The historical revelation is the ground of knowledge ·
for God's personal Being and God's personal Being
is the actual ground (Realgrund) of His revelation.169
In the incarnate Ohr.1st man knows God.
The exact connotation of the term "historical" as used
by Brunner has been the subject of debate.

At one place he

can say:
When we reflect on the rise of faith, it becomes clear
to us that a real event which transforms existence can
occur only on the place of real events, that is, of
historical events. For apart from real history, from
the events that impinge on my existence, there .!.u. no
reality that in the strict sense transforms existence.170
But at another place, in almost Bultmannian tones, Brunner
writes:
Hence by revelation ve mean that historical event
which is at the same t:i.me the end of history, that
is, an event whi"c h, if it really did take place, by

166~., pp. 106-07.
167I.hJ!, Theology g.!:. Crisi~, p. 2.
168!!!2. Christian Doctrine 2f. Creation, P• 52.
169Revelation

!.S.S. Reason, p·. 409.

170!b..! Christian Doctrine ,2.!: ill.!, Church, p. 143.
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its very force shattered the framework of history;
in other words, that in fulfilling the purpose of
history it ends it.171
So~e light can perhaps be shed on this problematic area of
Brunner•s approach to the historicity of Biblical events
by looking at his dialectical answer to the question of
such historicity:

Yes, for it is in history that this revealed secret
encounters me as truth. No, for it is the eternal
God aho now speaks to me in this historical revelation.
Thereby the historical event ceases to be hisiorical
and becomes living presence.
It is by present inspiration that past incarnation becomes truth to me. It is
by this historical revelatio~ or the incarnate vord
that thi~ present inspiration can take place.172
In so far as God's personal co·n fronta tion with man in Jesus
\'

Christ occurs now in this existential moment, it is transhistorioal, and the question of historieity does not apply.
But this present encounter is baaed upon and. finds its
content in a historical once-for-a11· event which actually
took place in Palestine almost two-thousand years ago.
Brunner says that it is God's Holy Spirit who "bears
witness to, and makes effectual, the historical Christ as
a living personal presence.» 173. To escape the dangers of
both objectivistic 17 4 and subjectivistic 175 views of revelation, the doctrine of the Holy Spirit must be set forth, says

171Hediator, p. 27.
l72ghristianity !,!lg Civilisation.

-

First Part, P• 40.

--

l73The . Christian Doctrine of the Church, p. 12.
174word .!.!!S ~ world, PP· 60-61.·
175The Philosophy .9.!. Religion, p. 113.
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Brunner.

"Scripture is only revelation when conjoined with
176
God's spirit in the present."
The operation of the Holy
Spirit . in making h.istorical events e~istantie.l 11:1 the key to
solving the historical problem stated above.

God's self-

communication and man's resultant obedience-in-trust come
together in the work of the Spirit.
E.

The Bible is the indispensable means of revelation.
'

.

Jewett says, "It is an open secret by this time that in
matters of Biblical criticism Brunner aligns himself with a
rather liberal school of thought." 177 Brunner admits,
ti

• • • I myself am an adherent of a rather radical school

of Biblical criticism. • • • ,,178

He can make such a state-

ment as, "Faith in the infallible Bible is no _ionger possible
for modern man. • • • "179
;
•h e ca n carry on a vociferous
polemic against verbal insp i ration; and yet ha does . not
lapse into a completely liberal position.

Jewett catches

the dialectic note of Brunner•s doctrine of the Bible as
he s o ys:
rather than getting above the alternative of theopneusty on the one hand a nd the abandonment of Scripture authority on the other, the pendulum of his
thought simply swings between the two, now touching
upon the one, now the other; now making assertions

1 7 61'.b!!. Philosophy 2L Religion, P• 151.
177Emil Brunner•s Concept of Revelation, p. 117.

178!.h.!t Theology tl Crisis·, P• 41.
179lli Christian Doctrine .2.! .:Yl.2, Church, p. 189.
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vhich involve the identification of the Word of God
and the words or men, now relativizing the function
of Scripture ss a vehicle of revelation to th~ point
of losing its normative character altogether.i8o
It is, of course, understandable that Brunner, with his
existentialist and personalietic intentions, vould differ
from the position or Protestant Orthodoxy on Scripture.
He sees Orthodoxy's insistence on the verbal inspiration
and infallibility of the Bible as aprioristic and the height
of objectiviam.

He labels these doctrines aa evidences of

natural man's inherent drive for assurances and security.
Brunner makes such statements as the following about
the centrality of tho Scriptures for the Christian faith:
Christian faith is Bible faith. When a Christian
speaks without qualification of God's rovelation,
what he means is Holy Scripture.181

.... . ... ... . . .. . .. . . . . .. . . ..

When the Christian speaks of the Word of God he means
in the first place the Word of Holy Scripture.182
• • • • • • • • • • •

• • • • •

• • • • • • • • • • • •
•

The nature of faith is not to be understood by
starting from the creed of the Church, but by starting
with the Biblical witness.183

ti3 4

tThe main thesis of Christianity runs thus:)
knowledge of God is to be drawn from Scripture.

180~ Brunner's Concept g.!: Revelation, P• 158.

l8ll'.h!!. Philosophy !2.f. Religio~, P• 150.

---

182vord and the World, p. 82.
183The ~hristian Doctrine· g! !h!. Church, p. x.

184The Philosophy 2f Relig!.2.D,, P• 150.

---
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The Bible is the pre-condition of all faith, that
which alone makes it possible~ And the whole Bible
at that.185
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Christian faith is faith in tho Bible in the sense
that the Bible alone is the place in which God speaks
to us, ,1udges us as through His ·.word, acquits ue
from condemnation, and imparts Himself to us as the
self-bestowing love in which He creates us anew.186
Brunner•s concern, however, is .that the Word cf God not be
identified with the words of the Scriptures. 18 7

This would

be the legalistic error that impairs the actual face-to-face

encounter of Subject with subject in the present moment.
This would lead, not to communion, but to .solitary, smug
intellectualism.
Brunner repeats over and over again the motto, "Christus
.£!.!. et do~l~Y~

i.9.!:1:.e.!i~·"

For its purpose of "cradling

.Christ II the Bible is absolute authority:

".. • • t.he

Scriptures are the absolute authority, in so far as in them
the revelation, Jesus .Christ Himself, is supreme. 11188
Christian faith is not founded o~ the letters of the Bible,
but on "our relation to the content or that which is proclaimed

lS5The Christian ~rine .Q.!'. ~ Church, P• 249.
186lli..!!•, p. 241.

187Th~ Theology 2.! Orisia, P• 19.

---

lSSThe Christian Doctrine

-or 9.9.9.,

P• 49.

52

in the Scriptures, or rather to ·the Person Himself, ·God mani.fest in the flesh, who speaks to me, personally, ·in the
Scriptures.n 189 Esch clause of the above quotation is absolutely fundamental to Brunner•s approach to the Bible and
revelation.

F.

Revelation is completed in faith's response.

Jewett defines Brunner•s position here;

11

Revalat:t.on is . • •

incomplete apart from its subjective side.

Revelation is
address and response, personal correspondence.n 190 Brunner
says, "In faith itself God's self-communication finds its
completion.n 191 God communicates Himself in love; when this
lova 13 known in responding love, communication has been
consummated.

God's revelation does not reach its goal apart
from the ~knowledge and act, knowing and happeningn 1 9 2 of
faith.

Reoeption of God's self-disclosure only occurs in

faith, that is, in the "personal decision vhich in responsibility answers God's challenge.n 19 3 Revelation is thus a
two-sided act; to abortively attempt its enclosure in a
book is to miss God's Word entirely.

According to Brunner,

there is no revelation in the strict sense apart from faith's

189

Revelat:1.on and Reason, P• l 69.

190~ Brunner•s Conoe:Qj, .Q.! Revelation, P• 135.

- ----

l91The
Ohristian
Doctrine of the Churoh, P• 171 •
.__,
....,_

l92The ~n.§.-Human Encounter, P• 64.
193word and the jorld, p. 28.
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response.
The aim

of

the divine revelation is at least twofold:

communion with God and the brother, and self-realization.
Since God makes Himself known to me, I am no longer
solitary; the knowledge or God creates community,
and indeed community is precisely the aim or the
divine revelation.194
Not only does the divine knowledge given to faith in revelation supply the answer to the question of truth, but it creates
fellowship between God and man as well.

Revelation, aays

Brunner, is "never the mere communication of knowledge, but
it is a life-giving and a life-renewing communion." 1 95
The man who, by revelation and faith, takes part
in the divine truth, at the same time takes part in
the divine love, and is therefore taken into communion.
To be in truth is to be in the Love of God, and to be
in the Love of God is to become a loving person, to be
in communion with God and men.196
Men come to know and love each other as a result or God's
self-disclosure of love; they also first come to know themselves thereby.

"Man can only understand himself when he

knows God in Hie Vord.nl9?

The gift of true personality

comes only through the Word of God.

"Personal being in the

full sense, in the nonlegalistio sense, hence the genuine
sense, is no •neat' entity whioh is an isolated phenomenon,

194Revelation and Reason, p. 27.
195Ih!. Christian Doctrine .9! God, P• 20.
l9 6christianitY !.ru! Civilisation.
197Brunner, Man in Revolt, P• 65.

First Part, P• 38.
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but it is only

!n !J21!!

R!,!.

~

• •

nl98

Apart from revelation

and faith man's self-~etimate is bound to be inaccurate.
The judgement we form of -ourselves is either realistic
and cynical, or idealistic and illusionary. Apart
from faith, even in the most serious exercise of our
moral consciousness, we see ourselves in the a~tificial
illumination of autonomy as tree beings who can do the
good because we ought.199
Only in the light of God's revelation, therefore, can man
identify himself and find his place in the world.
In summary, it might be said that if Brunner were .asked
the question, "How does man know the th i ngs of God?" or, "How
does man get to know his brother?," the concept o~ God's selfdisclosure in His historic and existential revelation would
be absolutely crucial to his answer.

Man "knows" the things

of God, not as he knows a fact, but in communion with God,
in person-to-person encounter with Him, an encounter
instigated and brought about solely by the God who reveals
Himself.•
The Relation of Reason tQ Faith and Theology
Jewett says correctly, "Brunner is far too astute a
thinker to commit himself to an uncritical and naive irrationaliam."200

Brunner would never say that ma~'s rational

facult·ies play no part in faith or theology; he says repeat-

198Brunner, Revelation and Reason; P• 410.•
l99Brunner-, l'..ru!, Philos!Ullli 91, Religion, p. 77.
200

!!!!!! Brunner's Qonoept g,! Revelation, p. 86.
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edly that reason is indispensable to both faith and theolo.g izing.

However, he becomes quite specific in definlng the proper

sphere and limits of man's intellect.
of reason is:

"The legitimate sphere
the things or the world." 201 ~

The intellect is the power of perceiving the finite,
especially the world of things and the like, and,
with the aid of this knovledge the power to live and
act in this finite world in a practical way.202
.

.

In close agreement with Luther's distinction between "things
below" and "things above," Brunner says simply, "Reason is
not given us · to know God, but to know the world." 20 3 Reason
is indeed given to man by God; but this does not mean that
God allows Himself to be known by reason.

Brunner makes this

interesting observation about the "givenness" of all human
knowledge:
God is the ground of all knowledge of truth. All
truth that we perceive and discover we perceive and
discover by virtue of the light that comes from God.
Eve.n the perception of the simplest mathematical
truth is possible only through a ray from the light
of God. God is the principle of all truth. But from
this we have no right to infer that in all knowledge
God may be known. Knowledge that comef from God is
different from the knowledge of God.20
Brunner, furthermore, contends that reason is capable

201

The Christian Doctrine ,2l, Creation,. p. 26.

202
203

Man .!Jl Revolt, PP• 250-51.

.
~ ~ t h e Horld, p. 33.

204
Revelation and Reason, P• 318.
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of marking out its own boundaries of competency. 2 05

The

reason can delimit itself to the things of this world, but
so often, due to man's sinful state, it fails to do so.
Thus this matter of drawing the line of competency becomes
the great problem for man and for faith.
The question for Christian theology is not whether
the reason has any rights, whether the reason has any
authority to judge what is true and what is false • • •
but where the line must be drawn which delimits the
sphere in which reason has complete control.
It is
not the validity of the criteria of reason as such
against which faith has to fight, but the fact that
they are turned into absolutes, making absolute claims,
The problem is one of defining the sphere of reason.20o
Brunner says that it is not the reason itself which is
in opposition to faith, but the "self-sufficient re 8 son.n 207
Faith does not imply a suicidal sacrifice of the intellect-"Jesus Christ is not the enemy of reason"

208

--but it does

require the limitation and control of reason.

It is this

limitation and this control which natural man cannot endure.

209

20 5 ~ Philosophy of Religion, p. 73.
(This writer
feels that this claim is perhaps one of the weakest points
in Brunner's presentation, a point that contradicts another
emphasis of Brunner himself:
natural man's inherent striving
after autonomy. Natural man's reason does not know its
bounds and cannot draw the line where its natural, thisworldly competence ceases. Cf. §.malcald Articles, Part
III:I:3; Epitome I:9.)
206Revelation !.,!lg, Reason, p. 380.
207Man jA Revolt, p. 244.
208Revelai!.2..!! and Reason, P• 16.
20 9Mediator, p. 43.
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"The reason corisidera itsalf entitled to dominate everything:
tc set up, and to dispooe of, tho criteria of all truth."210
Once again, man's basic drive :for autonomy is seen at the
base of hie epistemological problem.
Although God's revelation does not in any way contradict
what can be known of man in and through reason and experience,211
nevertheless the reason is utte~ly incapable of breaking
212
through "that ring of' immanence of the self-worJ.dn
into a
true knowledge of God and His Word.
Here all the methods of appropriation and verification
which are usually so uaeful--the methods by which we
are able to prove the actuality of something whbh is
said to hove happened, as ~ell as all our methods or
clarification through analogy, argument, and proof-break down completely.~ For the Cross and its meaning-a s is explicitlY, stated--is unique, never to be
repeated, and therefore far above all human analogies;
it can never be understood along the lines of intellectual argument.213
·
Knowledge of the world as established by God in its given

or

order is different from the knowledge
says Brunner. 214

the Creator Himself,

Even though man, for example, the mysti~,

might suppose he is independently breaking through into the
mysteries of the transcendent by the powers of his reason,
there is no hope that this can actually be the oase.

210 Revelation and Reason, P• 212.
2l1Brunner, Man 1!! Revolt, P• 61.
212 Brunner, Revelation!!.!!.!!, Reason, P• 369.

213

;Ibid. , p. 166.

214
.JE!.d., p. 381.

I
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Ruthlessly the reason spans the circle or immanence
around me, even if the idea of transcendence belongs
to this immanence. All the transcendence that I think
out for myself is only transcendence within immanence;
all that I describe as thoy within this my world of
immanence is only "thou-within-the-world-of-the-self'."
This world of immanence., in spite of all the variety
that takes place within it, is at bottom a static
system. No real communication takes · place.215
What then of a natural knowledge of God, that point at
which Brunner so notably differs with Karl Barth?

Brunner .

says,

Even the man to whom God has not made His Name
known is not without a certain knowledge of God;
for a knowledge of the Creator forms part of the
creaturely existence of man.216
At another place Brunnor writes, "Apart from any special
revelation, and indeed from a kind of inner necessity, the
human spirit formulates the Idea or God, or so~ething similRr • • • • 2 1 7

However, this knowledge is only a "confused

and uncertain knowledge of God, a kind or twilight knovledge.n 218
It does not create communion with the living God, 21 9 but
ultimately must be called "an abstraction.n

220

When Dale

Moody makes the following judgment, this vriter holds that
he is over-simplifying tb.e matter:

21 5Ibid., P• 367.
216The Cgristian Dootrin~
217Man

.2.! 9.2.9., P• 121.

!l! Revolt, p. 241.

218Mediator, P• 151.

-

219The Christian Doctrine

2!

God, p. 121.

220Revelation and Reason, p. 315.
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But Brunner is not willing to limit our knowledge of
God to special revelation. Where Barth rejects the
idea of the image as a formal potentiality ror God
Brunner retains it; where Barth speaks of a special
revelation alone, Brunner affirms a general revelation in nature and man •• , ,221
Brunner does speak of an "ime.go verbi II existing within man's
rational capacities in the same way as the "imago }ltl" exists
in his person, 222 but he is quick to declare its imperfection
and incompleteness.

He

does admit that the pagan can have

knowledge of God, 22 3 but he carefully states that this
knowledge is only an abstraction, a misconceived idea.

There

can be no valid knowledg~ of God and certainly no personal
relaticnship with Him by man's rational efforts.

As Brunner

says:
through tho revelation reason is placed in the
wrong, namely, in all her attempts to comprehend
and grasp the Divine which necessarily sprjng from
reeson.224
Brunner speaks often of the relationship between reason

or knowledge and faith.

He says that knowledge of an objec-

tive kind is antecedent to the personal act of faith :
It is true, of course, that the personal act or trust,
obedience and love is preceded by certain elements of
objective knowledge--as also they precede the aot of

221

QR.,~., p.

222

321.

Revelation~ Reason, P• 119.

223
224

Mediator, P• 121,
];bid., p.

43.
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faith--but they are not the personal act itselr.225
At another place, however, Brunner says that although faith
is accomplished in a process of thought, it does not spring
from thought, but rather from metanoia, from rethinking and
redirection. 226 What he must mean by these two views is
that . while faith is never without content, still it never
springs from man's unilateral "decision" to believe.

Orily

God's Word creates faith.
The truth, oonoeived in an abstract way, separated
from the Person of God who speaks, is not the ultimate, but the necessary pen-ultimate, which, however,
is based upon and proceeds from the ·ultimate. Our
nou@ therefore is the vessel but not the source of
the Word of God. Where it receives the Word of God
it is called: faith.227
Schrotenboer speaks correctly when he says that to
answer the question whether faith is knowledge or not to
Brunner would not be simple. 228

Faith is an act of
knowledge, according to Brunner, 229 but it is not knowledge
of disposable objects but of disposing subjects.

Brunner

writes:

22 5~elation and Rgason, p. 39.
(Using Brunner•s
analogy of the "knowledge relationeh1p 11 vithin wedlock, it

might be aaid that this is the knowledge a man has of his
wife prior to his oelfless trust and faith in her.)
226Ibid., pp. 216-17.

227Man !n Revolt, P• 245.
228 QJ?.. cit., p. 51.
229Revelat1on ~ Reason, P• 34.
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To the questiona "Is faith knowledge?" our first
answer would have to be "No: it is not the same
thing as everything else that ve mean by knowledge."
It arises only where all knowledge is at an end,
both objective knowledge, "explanation," and also
the subjective knowledge that we call understanding.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

And yet faith is knowledge, true self-knowledge, which
comes into existence only when what I already know
about myself--that I am responsible, that I am guilty-is taken up into this knowledge, confirmed and
radicalized by it.230
Faith is itself a thinking process; 2 3 1 it is accomplished in
ideas; 2 3 2 but this thinking and these ideas are of a different
kind than regular, objective thought.

These are thoughts and

ideas controlled by God; they are thoughts and ideas that
arise only within the personal relationship.

They are

thoughts of personal correspondence, intimate communicative
thoughts instilled by the operation of God's Spirit.
faith does not become knowledge, after a process of
rational activity; it is, itself, knowledge. I myself
know, in my faith, that Jesus Christ is my Lord • • • •
It is not a knowledge that I have gained by my own
efforts, but it is that which I now have, which is
neither capable or proof nor, indeed requires proof.
It is knowledge in the dimension of personal encounter:
God Himself discloses Himself to me. It is
revelation.233
The knowledge of faith is thus knowledge in a dimension
other than the dimension of common subject-object knowledge:

230.'.l.h.!. Qhristian Dogtr1.ne g! the Church, pp. 260-61.

-

--

231The Christian Doctrine or God, P• 73.
232.Il1!.g.., P• 73.

233Revelation and Rea@on, pp. 178-79.
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it is personal knowledge.

It is the difference between

knowing that a person is standing there and knowing that
a person loves the knower.
CFaithl is thus more like the acceptance of a
communication than an act of knowing~ for in . it
another communicates to me the mystery that only
He knows--namely that He loves me--while we, when
we speak of knowing, do not think or this word as
having any relation to love. What we call knowledge
and what we understand by fellowship or love lie on
two quite different planes.234
Objective knowledge rests on logic, on the certainty

or

sense-perception, on the laws of identity and coherence
and non-contradiction; faith-knowledge rests upon God and
His shared love.

Faith-knowledge, therefore, cannot be

proven; it has nothing to do with rational certainty.
11

Fai th is personal certainty. " 235

-Jewett is correct when

he says:
The Brunnerian concept of Paradox, which rests upon
the dimensional difference between the Word of God
and the word of man, tis] so crucial to an understanding or his solution of the problem of reason and
faith.236
According to Brunner, faith not only rejects reeaon but also
fulfills it.

Reason not only leads away from faith, but also

leads toward it.237

While faith is

11

poles apart" from what

234Brunner, Tse Qhristian Doctrine

.2.! 1h.!, Church, P• 259.

235arunner, Word and~ World, P• 75.
236Em1l Brunner•s Concept 2.! Revelatio~, p. 96.
2 3 7 schrotenboer, 2B•

.51!.i•, P• 58.
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ie usually meant by objective knovledge,

exist without this knovledge. 239

238

yet it cannot

The rational element is

neither the source nor the content of faith, and yet it is
incorporated within taith. 2 4°

Another way of saying this is

to say that even personal correspondence Mith a "Thou" is
commingled with objective Knowledge, however imperfect, or
that "Thou."
Brunner says again and again that faith does not put
the reason out of action or annihilate it, but that it is
·through faith that the ~ord of God takes reason into its
service. 241 As Jewett explains Brunner•s thought, "• •• the
path of reason is curved by the gravitational centre of
faith.« 2 4 2

Man essentially has been created not for thought,
but for loving, says Brunner. 243 Faith sets the reason free
to be an instrument and participant in love, in fellowship
with God and man.
The unredeemed man has two centers, one of reason
and the other of love • • • • faith consists precisely
in the fact that the heart and the reason again become
one, that the reason becomes warmed, and the heart
becomes rational.244

238Brunner, !h!. Christian Doctrine

21: !h.! Qm!!:.£!1,

239Brunner, Revelation and Reason, P• 420.
240schrotenboer, SW.• cit., P• 52.

• 241Reveletion and Reason, P• 429.
242E.ml! Brunner'a Concept g!," Revelation, p. 105.
243Revelation ~nd Reason, P• 428

244Ibid.

P• 259.
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An abrupt antithesis between revelation and reason is
foreign to the outlook of both the Bible 2 45 and the early
theologians of the Churoh, 24 6 says Brunner.

One does well

to remember that Brunner sets up the problem in terms of
"revelation and reason" and not "revelation or reason."
Henoe the question can never be vhethe~, but to vhat
extent and i n ~ sense, rsason and re~elation, faith
and rational thinking can be combined with one
another.247
·

It is precisely at this point, at this proposed inner penetration of the dimensions of reason and faith, that certain
of Brunner•s critics attack him. 2 4 8

Critical reason cannot

attain to the knowledge of revelation--it only leads

up

to

it--and yet there can be no revelation apart from reason.
The problem that Brunner encounters with this "dimensional"
differentiation between faith and reason can be made more
clear if one sees just how he views the various dimensions
of reality.

The picture is one of concentric circles around

a given center.

The center is the dimension of the person,

with the circles or scientific theology and then the formal
sciences proceeding outward from it.

There is a penetration

of the lower, non-personal dimension by the higher, personal

24 5 Ibid., p. 309.
246Ibid., p. 310.
247 Ibid., p. 311.
24 8 Jewett,

!!!!!!. Brunner's Concept of Revelation,

P• 99.
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one, from the center out.

The competency of reason in the

subject matter with which it is concerned is proportional to
its proximity to the personal center:
center, the gr~ater the competency.

the farther from the
The relation between

faith and reason is thus proportional and not precise.

The

personal and the rational interpenetrate all areas of human
activity, but proportionateiy. 249

It is this proportionate

interpenetration scheme which gives many critica~. many or
whom are perhaps looking for a sharply defined scheme presenting the areas of competency of both faith and reason, a difficult time vith Brunner's position.
Another helpful picture Brunner presents is that or
tangential and centripetal forces representing reason and
faith respectively:
The purely rational element of thought, logic, has
the tendancy to go straight forward from each given
point; but faith continually prevents this straightforward movement by its pull tovards the tevangelical1
Centre. So instead of a movement in a straight line
there arises a circular movement around the Centre-and that is a picture o~ real theological thinking.
Theological thinking is a rational movement of thought,
whose rational tendency at every point is being
deflected, checked, or disturbed by faith. Where
the rational element is not effective there is no movement of thoughtJ no theology; where the rational element alone is a~ work, there arise~ a rational speculative theology, which leads away fro~ the truth of
revelation. Only where faith and ra~ionality are
rightly interloc·ked can we have true theology, good
dogmatics.250

249Brunner, ,evalation and Resson, p. 383.
250The Christian Doctrine g! ~ , p. 76 • .
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Brunner insists that man can never separate the
abstract framework of reason and doctrine from the personal
Presence contained in them.

We know that we can never heve the one without the
other, and we know at the same time that the whole
point is to have the personal contained within the
abstract framework • • • • doctrine is indissolubly
connected with the reality it representa.251
Whenever God speaks to us He "says something," says Brunner,
and therefore "a certain amount of doctrine must be present
before living faith can come into being.« 252

The exact rela-

tion between the doctrine and the revelation is "incommensurable.n253

The difference betuean them is abysmal, and yet

the connection between them is essential.
It is, after all, the purely human faculty of thought

which qualifies the theologian for his work. 2 54

Reflection,

concepts, thought-forms, logical processos of proof--thase are
all the proper activities of the theologian as well as the
philosopher.

Theological knowledge is in that second circle,

once removed from the personal center, and this distinction
must be carefully maintained.
The difference between the knowledge of faith and

theological knowledge, which is so difficult to

2 51!!:!§. Divine-Human Encounter, P• 111.
252Ibid. ,· p. 120.
25.3Ibid.
254Brunner, lli Q.b_ristian Doct·ri ne

21: God. p. 75.
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define, and yet so necessary, is not one of subject
or of content, but one of the form or dimension of
existence. Theological or dogmatic knowledge is, .it is
true, the knowledge or faith in accordance with its
origin, but not with its form. One who thinks in
t~rms of theology must, so long as he does this, pass
f~om th~ attitude of the worshipper to that of the
thinker who is 9oncerned with his subject. Greater
clearness ·and precision of theological concepts can
o~~y be ga~ned at the cost of directness of faith
and that readiness for · aotion which it contains.2~5
In face of doctrinal errors or heresies, in face of the
questions which necessarily arise in the believer's mind, in
face ot the difficu lti e s which accompa ny .the original
Biblical doctrine,256 and especially in face of the need of
every Chr i stian man to know the meaning of "the Father in
Heaven, the forgiveness of sins, Atonement through the Son
of God, and tha Work of the Roly Spirit," 257

the Church must

ever be vitally concerned vith doctrinal clarity and accuracy,
says Brunner.

However, this more impersonal, objective con258
cern for sound doctrine "must always come second«
(and
between this "second" and "first" mission of the Church

yawns a dimensional divide) to the personal address of God's
Word, Jesus Christ who is the Truth, to the heart of every
me.n.

255 Ibid., p. 41.

2 5 6 Ibid., p. 40.
257.llli•, p. 10.
258

Revela~ion and Reason, p. 153.

CHAPTER II
HEINECKEN, KANTONEN AND SITTLER COMPARED WITH BRUNNER
Martin Heinecken
It has been shown that the theological epistemology of
Emil Brunner clusters around six major foci:
a.

The ' particular bent of his position is evoked
largely in antithesis to objective intellectualism
within the Church, and especially within Protestant
Orthodoxy.

b.

Biblical knowledge and truth is set over against
Greek knowledge and truth.

c.

The subject-object split of philosophical, analytic
epistemology gives way to a Subject-subject relational framework of knowledge in Biblical epistemology.

d.

Theological personaliam is the key to Brunner's
epistemology.

e.

God, in His self-disclosure, is the absolute
Subject of religious knowledge.

r.

Wh j le reason is essential for both faith and
theology, it always serves a secondary function and
is never to be mistaken for the primary personalistic means of "knowing" God.

In this second part of the study, the viewpoints on this
subject or Martin Heinecken, Taite Kantonen and Joseph Sittler
will be presented.

The same six divisions or categories used

in Chapter I will serve as the basic framework for this chapter.
Thus Martin Heinecken 1 s thoughts on the historical perspective
of this problem, the difference between the Greek and Biblical
traditions in the area of epistemology, the place of the
subjective and objective in theological epistemology, end so
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on through the six divisions, will be presented.

Heinecken

will then be followed by a similar study or Kantonen, and
Kantonen by Sittler.
None of these three American Lutheran theologians admit
to an excessive dependence upon Brunner for their thought in
the area of the nature and perception of religious truth.
Each of them refers to Brunner a number of times by way of
quotation or allusion, 1 but most cases of similarities in
position cannot be explained as prima-facie dependence of
the Lutherans upon Brunner.

It is, of course, possible that

all four men are deriving their homogeneous portions from a
common source.

1

Both Brunner 2 and Heinecken3 are heavily

"'

indebted to Soren Kierkegaard and to existentialist thought;
it is probable that Kantonen and Sittler profit from Kierkegaard also, even if not in such an outspoken manner.

It

might be added that Kierkegaard's famed battle against sterile

1 Martin J. Heinecken, !h!, Moment Before QQ,g, (Philadelphia:
Muhlenberg Press, 1956), p. 111.
Martin J. Heinecken, "Currents in American Theology,"
Lutheran World, III (March, 1957), 368.
T. A. Kantonen, The Message of the Church 19. 1h.!, World
,2.!: Today (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1941),
p. 141.
T. A. Kantonen, ! Theology .!:.2.£ Christian Stewardship
(Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1956), P• 73.
Joseph Sittler, The Doctrine g,!: 1h§. Word (Philadelphia:
Muhlenberg Press, l94sT;' PP• 26, 36, 54, ~
2nale Moody, "An Introduction to Emil Brunner," !h!,
Review !nd Expositor, XLIV (July, 1947), 313 •
. 3 ncurrents," .2.la• oit., P• 362.
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intellectualism in the Church coincides quite nicely with the
major emphasis of each of these four men.

But this study does

not have as its intention the tracing of dependencies in the
thought of these four theologians; it only seeks to present
and compare their respective positions within the framework
of the six categories listed above.
The historical perspective
Although Martin Heineoken does not investigate the history
of philosophy as thoroughly as does Brunner to pinpoint the
foundations of a subject-object antithesis type of epistemology
,,.

within theology, ' he does repeatedly refer to Protestant
Orthodoxy in much the same vein as Brunner.

v

He, too, sets

up the period of seventeenth century Orthodoxy as the major
antithesis to hie ovn position.

Heinecken says that Orthodoxy's

concern for maintaining doctrinal purity was correct, but that
its method of doing so was misguided and ill-founded.

He

writes:
tLutherJ returned to a biblical orientation completely
foreign to the scholastic orientation, and yet it vas
precisely to that orientation that seventeenth-century
orthodoxists returned and while they wrestled nobly
to do justice to the dynamic of the gospel, they neverthele•s straitjacketed end imprisoned it. With ever
finer end finer rational distinctions they tried their
best to do justice to the mysteries or the faith and
to safeguard them against heresy. But because the
basic orientation ot the philosophy with which they
operated was wrong, it resulted in any number of the
most fearful distortions.4

4christ Frees~ Unites (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press,

1957), P• 68.
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Heinecken says the philosophical orientation upon which
Orthodoxy was structured was that of scholasticism.

In such

doctrines as the communicatio idiomatum and the kenosis, says
Heineoken, this scholastic bent is especially prevalent. 5
Also in the doctrine of God, the scholastic-Aristotelian
framework is obvious.
So, for example, the doctrine of God followed the
pattern of the definition of other terms, classifying
God in the class of personal beings and then distinguishing him from other members of this class by various
attributes, such as absoluteness, aseity, holiness, and
so forth, arriv i ng at these attributes Xi!. eminentiae,
via negationis and !JA causalitatis. This is boxing God
up very neatly and, even if the anthropomorphisms ar~
recognized as inadequate, the whole procedure cannot
do justice to the living God, who in the Bible is not
ever defined in this way, but only described in his
actions in the most lordly, quite arbitrary, irrational, offensive, contradictory fashion.
Once having
boxed up God in the deiinition, it is the very devil
to liberate him again.
This attempted "boxing up" of God in the definition, the idea
or the theological system is the very antithesis to true
knowledge of God, Heinecken would argue.

It is just this

attempt at explaining religious truth in a nice, coherent
compendium of doctrines with which Luther had broken.
Not only did Orthodoxy revert to a previous scholastic
doctrinal framework, but American Lutheran theology, in its
close adherence to Orthodoxy and its methods, unwittingly
promulgated the same perversion.

5Ibid., p. 70.
6Ibid., PP• 68-69.
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American Lutheran theology • • • generally adherred to
the seventeenth century orthodoxy with remarkable consistency. Practically ell the textbooks on which
Lutherans until very recently were trained follow the
same pattern--a repristination of seventeenth century
Lutheran orthodoxy es compiled in Schmid's Doctrinal
Theology .Qf 1h!l, Evangelical Lutheran Church (Hollaz,
Quenatedt, Chemnitz, Gerhard, eta.) • • • • This theology
had the great merit of being o bulwark against the confusion of philosophical speculation, but as recent research
has shown, it clearly marks a departure from the theology
of Luther and a relapse into the Aristotelian categories
with which Luther had broken.?
Heinecken, like Brunner, sees in this ' type of theological ,/
endeavor the whole trend toward self-security.

"In the objec-

tive sacraments and in a plain coherent system of doctrine
based on an infallible Bible there is a refuge from the
anxiety of the human situation."

8

But this refuge within

Man-made systems and assurances is a false refuge, says
Heinecken, and one that can only lead avay from Him who is
the true Refuge.
in this wsy.

11

• • • the living God is not apprehended

When ycu grasp the idea, you clasp an idol to

your bosom. n9
Heinecken holds that existentialist categories and thoughtforms hold the key to theological truth and that they can
1

render the 6hurch of this day a "much better service" than
the scholastic-orthodox thought patterns of the seventeenth

7 Heineoken, "Currents,"
S Ibid • , p. 3 63 •
9Moment, p. 234.

.Q.12•

cit., PP• 361-62.
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century.lo

Heineoken is tacitly agreeing with the movement

he is describing as he says:
Common also to this whole group Cneo-or·thodoxy) is the
emphasis upon event, ~noounter, crisis, paradox, and a
differentiation of the Hebrew-Christia~ thought-forms
from Greek and other alt~rnat1ves. Revelation is
personal encounter and not th.e making k'nown or· true
propositions. Crisis replaces progress and evolutionary
development. The human situation in existence is analyzed with the help of Kiarkegaard and existentialist
theology,11
Heinecken uses the categories or existentialist theology
listed above almost without exception in his own presentation,
It is his involvement in existentialist thought primarily which moves him to see in Protestant Orthodoxy a tangential
emphasis in the field or Biblieal truth and epistemology.
Greek versus Biblical concepts of knowledge
Heinecken goes to some pains to distinguish between a
static, objective Greek approach to truth and theology and
a dynamic, existential, Biblical approach,

The existentialist

themes,in particular, show through in his position,

With

regard to the personal versus the abstract levels of truth,
he says, "• •• the particular must always take preference
over the universal," 12 and"• •• this business of abstracting

lOchrist Frees~ Unites, P• 72,
ll11currents," _q;e.

ill•,

12God 1!l..1h!. §paoe
Company, 1959), P• 70.

~

P• 366.
(Philadelphia:

The John C, Winston
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from the particular also involves a great loaa.n 1 3

The

here and nov, the individual, the concrete, as contrasted
with the g•neral and abstract is the important factor within
the epistemological God-man relationship.
In this relationship the "moment" ls the. decisive factor
and not a timeless, unalterable, static body or truths.
Here in this moment when God encounters man, not in
an instant of recollection, but in the begetting of
the truth in him, there is compressed all eternity •
• • • This moment is the rullnesp of i!.m.!• It is quite
different from that other ever-present possibility or
realizing the eternal truth of the reason in which no
encounter with the living God is involved, but only
the awareness of certe1n "ideas."14
·

v

Because of this present, existential nature of the God~nn relationship, Heinecken holds that there can be no fixation of theology in a eystem adequate for all times.

Theology,

in order to express the truth of the gospel, must remain in
constant flux.

An absolute, once-for-ell solidification of

doctrine attempting to set forth the truth of God and man in

.

their relationship is "a monstrosity,"
rejection

or

15

and ultimately a

the sola fide principle.

Suoh unity of faith is, however, not achieved once
and for all by agreement upon one docirinal system
fixated for all times in precisely those terms.
This would be confusing the - vord of man and the word

l3Ibid., P• 30.

1 4Heinecken, Moment, P• 104.
15..lll!g,., p. 8.
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of God, a man-made theology with the actual divine
self-impartation. This would make man the master,
who baa God boxed up in these formulations and vould
be a denial or justification by taith.16
Further to demonstrate the difference between Greek

"I-It" and Biblical "I-Thou" truth Heinecken on several
occasions uses the analogy of "wriat-watch time" (Greek)
over against "alarm-clock time" (Biblical). 1 7

One type of

truth emphasizes tho timeless, the regulated, the systematic;
the other stresses the punctiliar, the awakening, the present
call to aotion. I1 The one type
of t~uth can be anticipa ted and
.
controlled by man; the other catches man unexpectedly and
demands a response.

\

Along with Brunner, Hoinecken complains that objective
thought in the Greek tradition te~ds to build up an autonomy
18
and a smug self-sufficiency within the knower.
But not so
with the Word of God.

Here man is never in control; he never

has a manipulable objeot at his disposal; there is no guaranteed authority either of infallible hierarchy or book--man
19
lives by faith, and faith is always a risk. - The same

l6Heineckan, Christ Frees !.ru! Unites, P• 49.
17He1neoken, Space Age, p. 66. See also: Martin J.
Heineeken, Beginning ind!!!§. 9.! ~ World (Philadelphia:
Muhlenberg P~ess, 1960), p. 26.
18Moment,

p.

226.

19 Martin J. Heineoken, "The Tension between Love
and Truth,11 ~ Lutheran Quarterly, XI (August, 1959), 206.
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situation pertaina in life in general, says Heinecken:
In logic thero are nothing but static relationships
which eternally are what they are and cannot possibly
change. • • • But in life, which is always in flux,
always in process ot bgcoming, there oan b~ neither
logical necessity nor absolute consistency nor ebsolute certainty.20
In the one type of relaticnsbip, man lives by guaran,t ees
which he himself can manipula te; :t.n the other he lives by
faith.

In the one his knowledge of God is direct and deter-

minate; in the other it is always in§..!?..!!!.•
Heineoken makes frequent use of the term "raradox" to
denote the sign of B1blical truth as opposed to the noncontradictory nature of Greek truth.

The religious paradox

1s se en as "the absolute barrier which blocks the way to a
mars intellect a ppropriation of a God-ides and forces man to
be confronted with the living God in the 'hiddenneas• of his

revelation." 21

Heinecken says that whenever a Christian
I

talks about the God-relationship he is confronted vith something which he cannot understand and which is a mys~ery to
I

him, and thus he necessarjly finds himself involved in para22
·
doxical language. With somewhat Bultmannian overtones Heineoken explains just vhat he means by labeling the Christian

20

Noment, P• 64.

21 Ibid., P• 22.

22

-

Ibid., P• 73.
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faith "paradoxical":
So it is misleading to say that a certain "fact" is
paradoxical. The fact ~s "incomparable" and it is
the language used in attempted description and
attempted communication of this tact which ia
pnradoxica1.23
Thie is far different from the Greek intellectualist notion
that doctrines and systems can adequately enclose the mysteries
of God.

Heinecken concludes that the paradox is one of the

very basic categories of systematic theology which must be
preserved for twentieth century theology. 2 4

"There is some-

thing about the Christian proclamation which makes a mere
intellectual acceptance impossible." 2 5

The paradox is in

the proclamation, however, and not in the fact itself.

The

fact, for example, of the resurrection, is what it is and
like no other fact; it baffles description.

Thus it cannot

be communicated directly or logically or objectively by
language; it can merely be pointed at.

The fact must be

assimilated via an experiential involvement prompted and
maintained only by the Lord Himself.
Heinecken maintains that the gospel is in "a class by
itself."26

23

The distinction between the t~uth and knowledge

Ibid., P• 57.

24.Il2!g,., P• 382.

2 5Ibid., P• 6.
26 "The Pre-theological Curriculum," !h!, Lutheran
Quarterly, II (November, 1950), 428.
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of the gospel and the truth and knowledge ot, tor example,
mathematics, is qualitative and not quantitative.

And, as

Heineoken says, "• •• you can never through quantitative
changes leap over into a new quality.n 27 Christianity and
Christian epistemology are "not merely a matter of the way
in which we ordinarily communicate ideas because we share the
referents of the world involved • • • • No knowledge is
imparted in the simple way • • • • n 28 In the following statement Heinecken further explains the qualitative difference
between the two kinds of knowledge:
To possess the truth of God is something other than
a formal correspondence between words or thoughts in
the head and something objective and outside of the
mind to which these ideas correspond or with which
they are identical. This is not what the Bible means
by knowing God. God is not a reality corresponding
to my idea of him in my mind, any more than my wife
or any person is. We just have to rid ourselves of
such Platonic notions. fTo know God is to be known of v
him, and this is a matter of right relationship, as
has so often been pointed out after the analogy of the
sexual relation. The God of the Bible does not
correspond to any single idea in man's mind. He is not
the archetype of an idea. He is the living God who
confronts man, stands over against him, addresses him,
face to face, eye to eye, even though this is in a
medium or mask.29
Truth and the knowledge of the truth to Heinecken, as well
as to Brunner, is a relational process; it is found in the
encounter an~ not at the end of a syllogism.

27Moment, p. 182.

28~ . , P• 6 •
29nTe.nsion," .2.l2.• ..£!!., PP• 201-02.
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The subject-object split and beyond

Brunner has ·been shown to overcome the subjec·t-object
antithesis with his "personal correspondence" ~ormulation.
Heinecken acknowledges perfect agreement with him on this
point.30

Heinecken says:

He Cman1 cannot grasp God as the object of his thought-he can only encounter him person to person. God always
remai ns the subject who continues to address man, to
hold him responsible, to keep him in front or himself.
Man can never reverse this relationship and make God
the object.31
God is always the Subject, and, according to Heinecken,

He is only known in subjectivity.

"Though objectively
present God is discerned only in inwardness.n 32 Heineoken

makes stronger statements tha~ Brunne r regarding truth as

subjectivity.

He writes:

The reassuri.ng presence of the atoning and victorious
Lord is discernible only inwardly by the one who is
not just a spectator but a participator. Hence truth
is aubjectivity.33
And furthermore, Heinecken writes:
It is God hlmselt who is encountered only subjectively
and never objectively. All the resuitant affirmations

30 «Bultmann's Theology and the Message of the Preacher,"
I!!!, Lutheran Quarterly, VI (1954), 294.

31
32
33

Moment, p. 72.

Ibid .• , P• 85.
Ibid., P• 270.
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of faith are made only by the one who has experienced
this encounter for hi~self.34
'

Properly understood, Heinecken and Brunner are agreed here.
I

T~ey both say th~t God is known only through personal in-

volvement.

Both say that God is indeed objectively present

in His revelatjon, but that this revelation can only be
appropriated by a decisive, inner correspondence.

It is

not an instance of a subject grasping an object but of a
Subject coming face-to-face with a subject.
Personalism as the key
Once again, Heinecken is in close agreeman·t wfth Brunner
in finding the person-to-person rel·ationship the most apt
analogy in describing the God-man relationship.

Heinecken

writes:
Moreover, in the exigencies or life, the supposed
certainty of knowledge forsakes man, thus indicating
that in the God-relation a different kind of knowledge
is required in the very nature of the personal relationship. Here "knowledge" is a relation of"personal
correspondence," a "knowledge" in the intimate sense
of participating in the other as in the intimacy of
the sexual union. It is a relationship of actual
obediencG-in-trust, a relationship of having the other
impart, not ideas or gifts only, but actually himselt.35
In this dimension of personal relationships, Heinecken warns ·
that the statistical, quantitative categories of the objec-

34
~ . , P• 226.

35

.!1:?.!s.•, PP• 142-43.
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tive, natural sciences simply do not apply.

This is also

true, to a certain extent, of theology as a scientific endeavor:

the personalistio categories often do not apply.
A method of prediction and control simply destroys
the personal relation. It turns the I-Thou relation
into an I-It relation, It turno the relation where
two personal beings confront each other in personal
address into a relation where the one uses a thing
merely for his purposes, manipulating it and pushing
it arQund, Another person dare never be used in this
way.36

In a similar vein, Heinecken says elsewhere that the moment
one reduces the living person confronting one (whether man
or God) to a definition or an aQstract thought, one loses
him,3 7 "An individual person cannot be thought but only
encountered,

Neither can God be thought but only encountered.»3 8

The letter smothers the spirit.
The fact that God reveals Himself in a personal manner
necessarily sets certain limits on man's penetration into
God's mysteries. Just as with another person, 39 mon can knov
only as much as God discloses, and this, not in an objective,
tabulatable set of data, but only in a living obedienoa which
often must "trust that revelation in oontradiotion to the svidence.1140

36Heinecken, snace AB.!., P• 67 •

.37christ Frees JJ.\9. Unites, p. 69,
38Home~t, p. 147.
39uein.e.oken, Space Age, pp. 107-08,

40Heinecken, Moment, P• 111.
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It is idolatry to find a certainty other than that
of the per~onal relation or trust 1n the livi~& God
who confronts one and calls one to decision. When this
confrontation ceases one communes in the chambers of
one's own mind with a logical essence instead of with
that living God who cannot be so roduoed.41
Heinecken, along with Brunner, but not as extensively
as Brunner, points out that the decisive factor in God's
personal revelation and man's personal response is the Person,
Jesus Christ.

The person of Jesus Himself is essentially

what makes the God-man relationship personal.

"The Church

proclaims the personal Truth, with whom we must enter into
a personal relation of trust, confidence, and obedience.»4 2
This fact that God revealed Himself in a person is only half
of both Brunner's and Heinecken 1 s development of the personalistic theme, ho~ever.

As far as epistemology is concornod,

the annlogy which they both draw between the knovledge one
person has of another (particularly in the marriage relationship) and the knowledge one has of God and of religious truth
is the point of chief importance.

Their entire theological

epistemology is based on this analogy:

man's knovledge or

God is like man's intimate knowledge of another person, with
all the implications and limitations this involves.
God as Revealer
Heinecken, like Brunner, not only sees the doctrine of

41~
Tl-!"~
· , PP• 57 - 58 •

42ttTension," .::..s:.
on. _cit., p. 20 5.
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revelation as being closely intertvined within the area of
epistemology, but he also oomes to much the same conclusions
in hie elaborations of the doctrine of revelation as does
Brunner.

Severai distinctly Lutheran aspects oome through:

an emphasis on the sacraments as a means of revelation, and
the reference to "masks" as the framework of actual revelation.
But for the most part there is close coincidence of thought.
Heinecken insists that God remains the Subject throughout ~
the revelatory process.

"God is absolutely other from the

existing individual but he has revealed himsolf and therefore
I 'know' him in this revelation.
subject. 11 43

But he still remains the

Heineoken says that "no one--no witness, no

human tea cher--co.n directly communicate the God-relationship,"
but thot this i~ solely God's prerogative.44
Q..Q..q reveals himself.

It is God vho is the initiator
of the revelation. This is not an act of human discovery
as when ma n discerns an indubitable truth with the power
of his reason. Nor is it a human hypothesis set up
b y man in an effort to account for certain experienced
phenomena. It is rather God on his own initiative
encountering man in his existence at a time and
plaoe.45

God is always at the beginning as well as at the end of revelation.

He discloses Himself.

Heinecken also speaks of the otherness of God even in

4.3Moment, p. 80.
44 Ibid • , p. 2 58 •
45Ibid.·, p. 102.
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the midst or His revelation.

As he says, "God has a secret

which he does not share with u~.u4 6

The difference between

God and men is not only one or degree, but or kind as well.
"The unseen and unseeable God is, quite simply, in a dimension
different from that or space. • • • n47

Whan man is confronted

by God, says Hein~ckan, he is confronted "not only by a power
and a knowledge and a goodness which are quantitatively beyond
him.

There is a qualitative differ~nce.n4S

All metaphysical

speculation, all attempts to reduce God to a simple idea, all
deductive assertions as to God's nature in itself are blocked
by an absolute barrier.
God in and for himself ia still "unknown" as the
absolutely, qualitatively different about whom
nothing can be said, except by way of pointing
out tha differanoa and the mystery • • • • As for
asserting his metaphysical essence and attributes,
thia ia a presumptuous and vain endeavor.49
Heinecken makes an important distinction between the onto-

logicul and spiritual uspeot.s of this problarn when ha says:
So the absolute qual1tative otherness of God, it is
said, is not a metaphysical otherness at all. It is
not a mattor of s ome chasm between man and the God
in whose image he is after all made and whom, in
some sense, he must resemble. The difference, it
is said, lies in the realm of the "religious" and not
that of metaphysical speculation.50

46Beginnilig

.w i.ru!

47J;bid., P• 25.
48.M2,men~, p. 69.

49..IJ2.!g,., pp. 109-10.
.
50 Iblcl•,
P• 117.

of' the World, p. 45.
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The above statement would seem to deny the validity of
any kind

or

analog_!!. antis.

The question might be raised,

however, as to what this position, if consistently held, would
imply if applied to Heinecken's own personalistic analogy.
Due to God's complete otherness, perhaps even this analogy
cannot be pressed as far as both Heinecken and Brunner press
it.

What Heinecken is trying to say here, however, is that

even the category of "completely other" can be construed
as a metaphysical category.

He wants to take God's trans-

cendence out of the area of ontology and put it back into the
area of the existential.

God is completely, inestimably

above a specific man as he confronts that man and demands an
answer.
Thus, even in His revelation, God remains hidden and
mysterious.

Even in His revelation He is known in a dif-

ferent way than the truths of reason or even other historical persons are known.
says Heinecken.5 1

"Faith is never turned to sight,"

God always wears a mask in His revelation

and confronts man in such a way that He is never directly
discernible.5 2

Heinecken repeats over and over again:

can be known only with the eyes of faith.

God

"• •• God never

did, does not now, and never will appear to man directly for
all to see • • • • It is only to the eyes of faith that the

51
52

Ibid., P• 112.

.Iill•, P• 68.

86
living God is discernible.n 53

Thus revelation and faith are

always corollaries; . there o.a nnot be one without the other •.
It must be made clear at this, point that tai th, as Heinecken
is using it here, is no. mere acceptance of statements or a~sent
to doctrines.

"The revelatory eyents I must apprehend with my

whole being, with the risk of my life and the transformation
of my existenoe.n54

This is the involvement which faith entails.

God is known through the act or inner transformation of
one's being, says Heinecken. 55

Thus sanctification is not

considered as a result of the self-disclosure of God; it is
in the very act of renewal that God's self-communication
is truly realized.

Repentance and renewal are thus prere-

quisites for true knowledge of God.

"The disciple • • •

must in this moment of encounter be born a new creature. 1156
Speaking of the Pentecost gift of the Spirit, Heinecken says:
Not long years of study, not painstaking intellectual
effort, but inner humility, openness, receptivity, the
recognition of a common human need were the conditions
of understanding this new language which the Holy
Spirit taught.57
A summary statement might be this one of Heineoken•s:

"God

53spac~ Age, p. 101.
54Moment, p. 138.
55rbid., p.· 68.

56ibid., PP• 104-05.
57Basic .Qbristiar. Teachings (Philadelphia:
Presa, 1949), p. 107.
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is not meant to be understood, but to be gbezad."58
Heineoken speaks of the aotual historical character of
God's revelation.

"God reveals himself through actions and

not through the ~bstraot thoughts of philosophers."5 9

This

historical element is indeed part of the hiddenness of the
revelation.

This is the very offense to man's reason.

It Cfor example, the incarnationl is the revelatory or
salvatory event in which, quite paradoxically and in a
hidden, non-discernible way as far as the senses or
the insights of reason are concerned, the unseen God
enters into space and time and effects man's redemption
by imparting himself.
Such salvatory events are inseparable from historical events. They are "hidden"
in them.60
This, of course, is good Lutheran sacramental theology.
Neither to be identified with the medium (except, of course,
in the case of Christ) nor removed from the medium, God
reveals Himself and comes through the historical, present,
concrete medium.

As Heinecken states it, "This God of love

can be encountered at any time and at any place where~
&2_spel is E!:oclaimed and the sacraments§.!:!. administered."
Ultimately Heinecken, like Brunner, explains Biblical
epistemology by referring to the work of the Holy Spirit.
"• •• any critic of the epistemology of the Christian

58Moment, p. 128.
59nasio Teachings, p. 29.
60«Bultmann's Theology," -Sm• cit., P• ~90.
61Moment, ·p. 116.

61
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religion ought to be silenced by the tact of Pentecost," he
62
says.
To the basic question "How does one know God?,"
Heinecken gives his answer and the answer of the Christian
tradition as he says:
that God is "known" only through the enlightenment ot
the Holy Spirit who proceeds from the Father and the
Son and whose coming is a part or the revelation of
God in Christ, so that there is no revelation except
as the sending of the Spirit is included as a part of
the revelatory event. 63
The knowledge which the Spirit gives will be received in a
different manner than the knowledge that "two times two is
four or that Caesar crossed the Rubicon," says Heinecken.
But t hose who have celebrated Pentecost will know, and they
will know they know.64
God reveals Himself as a personal being, says Heinecken,

"a center of will and responsibility." 65

He reveals His
66
heart, His true disposition, "which is love," to men.
Man
is by nature "aware" or the "Other," but about His nature and
disposition he knows nothing.
His Cman'sl predicament is not his wrestling with
the ouestion as to whether or not there is "a god,"
but ;ether to know the name, the true nature or

62.Th!.!i•, p. 79.
63tbid., pp. 77-78.

64Ibid., p. 80.

65Beeic tg1chings, P• 25.
66Heinecken, Moment, p. 116.
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that "unknown oneL" with whom he finds himself
wrestling • • • • 6'l
Heinecken admits to a general revelation, a universal divine
confrontation of man in his existence giving rise to an undefined "existential awareness of the 'other, 1 ~ 68 but he says
also that the gods of natural man "are one and all idols,
who must be suppla~ted by the true God, .made 'known' only in
Jesus Christ. 1169 The god arrived at by man's reasoning is
never "the Creator upon whose will of love all that is
depends absolutely" Rnd tttho One to whom he (man1

owes

all.» 70
God is not ther~ at the fringes of man's kno~ledge
simply to explain what still remains inexplicable
and mysterious, but the living God confronts man
at all t i mes. • • • 71
Heinecken is too much of an existentialist to deny any
degree of awareness of the transcendent within man's natural
inner experience.

By an awareness of one's own limitations,

by a sensitivity to the absolute claim laid upon man, by the
feelings or insecurity and the threat of meaninglessnees, 72
man "knows" or the "Other," but Heinecken would say, with

67M. J. Hei.necken, "Man Today and the Message of
Jus-l;ifica ti~n, n Lutheran World, IX (July, 1962), 197 •

68 Moment, p •. 123.
69Ibid.,. p. 77.

70~., pp~ 126-27.
7lspace Age, p. 73.
72Ibid., pp. 108-10.
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Brunner, that this knowledge is confused and idolatrous.
The relation of reason to faith and theology
This statement by Heinecken could just as well have
been made by Brunner:
While the formulation and acceptance of doctrine is
not to be equated with the personal faith-relationship,
it is most certainly inseparable from it • • • • IWhile
~
the biblical record is not just a compendium of doctrines or truths but the witness to certain events, it
is as such a witness replete with the doctrines which
the transformed believers affirmed and which distinguished
them from their pagan neighbora.73
__., .,.
Just as God's revelation in His actions is always "inseparable
from interpretive words, 1174 so man's affirmation of faith must
be "in the form of sentences."~

In speaking of the necessity

for anthropomorphisms in the Bible, Heinecken says that in
order that man might know the living God, He had to reveal
Himself "within the realm of what man can conceive."

76

He

had to submit Himself also to man's rational faculties, or
f

no communication would take place.

11 • • •

because men

believe in God they also believe certain things," says
Heinecken.77

He insists, however, that these "things" about

God are not to be confused with God Himself.

73,hrist Frees and Unit!.§., PP• 47-48. 7411Tension," ~·

ill•,

p. 202.

75!bid., p. 203.
76space Age, p. 87.
77Basic Teachings, P• 18.
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is a distinction between 'believing in' and 'believing that.•
Only 'believing in' is faith.
'Believing that• accompanies
the 'believing in.•n 78 The assentia is a necessary but
explicitly secondary corollary to the fiducia.

One can have

a "belief that" without a "belief in," but not vice versa.
Heinecken does say that a specified list of doctrine is not
necessary for faith:
The acceptance of a doctrine or the atonement can save
no one. Only actually being drawn i nto the right Godrelat i onship matters, and that can ha ppen even without
the acceptance of some dootrine.79
Although it is not clear what the "some" ot the above statement
includes, it can be said that Heinecken would not agree to the
possibility of faith with no objective knowledge whatsoever.
Just what is the difference, then, which Heinecken sees
between the knowledge of faith and analytic, objective
knowledge?

First of all, the former is found only within the

existential relationship wh i le the latter is achieved in a
detached, verifiable manner.
By way of contrast with these tobjectivel propositions,
the truth of which is determinable in spectator fashion
either with apodictic certainty or with a degree of
approximation only, there are "existential" propositions. These cannot be either affirmed or denied
except by an "existing" individual who is involved
in the entirety of his existence.SO

78Ibid.
79Ibid., P• 87.
80Moment, p. 271.
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One is built on the subject-object split; the other is based
on a Subjeot-subjeot relationship.
Man cannot know him CGodJ in the sense in which we
know other th i ngs, when the idea in our mind (subjective) corresponds to some external refQrent (objective). Ve can know him only by being in the right
relationship or trust and · obedience and love.Bl
For the certainty or faith's knowledge there· can never
be substituted "some kind of external guarantee.n 82

In tact,

as Heinecken says,
the only way I can discern that I am confronted with
the absolute miracle is if it does indeed conclusively
confound~ understanding no matter how often I may
say that the total view is in harmony with what some
call '' the depth of reason." 8.3
Even though a certain belief is contradictory for thought and,
humanly speaking, quite impossible, yet the man of faith,
on the basis or the personal confrontation with God, believes
and asserts that it "is.« 8 4
Objective propositions and knowledge present the alternatives of faith or doubt, says Heinecken, while faith-directed,
existential knowledge confronts a man with the decision ot
faith or offense .

"• •• in the former case the affirmation

or denial makes no difference in the way I live; in the latter

81
82

83
84

Ibid., p. 72.
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a risk is involved.n 8 S

In this faith-offense ultimatum

presented by religious truth, one can sum up Heinecken's

views with .regard to the nature and perception of religious
truth:
Those who are confronted with this presence of God in
Jesus as the Christ do not face the e.lternative or
belief or unbelief--as they would in relation to an
ordinary historical event of which they are mere spectators and which is established for them merely on the
basis of probability and the accumulation of the
weight of evidence. Rather they face the alternative
of either "faith" or "offense"--surrendering in trust
to the One who makes the absolute claim upon their
lives, or "being offended" by the preposterousness of
the claim. They cease from being mere spectators,
because the demands of this One call for a decision
e1ther of giving up one's autonomy and ,self-will in
"faith" or retaining them in "offense.«86
Thi~ option betwe·en autonomy on the one hand or surrendering in obedience to the divine claim laid upon one's life on
the other is precisely the option which Brunner sees confronting man.

Except for minor variations, therefore, it can be

concluded, on the basis of the evidence presented in this
section, that Heinecken and Brunner are in substantial
agreement on the question of the nature and perception of
religious truth.
Taito Kantonen
Neither Taito Kantonen nor Joseph Sittlor have as much
to say in their published materials as does Martin Heineoken

851.l?.!g,., p. 272.
86tbid., P• 55.
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on the subject of this study.

For this reason the treatment

or both these men will be of a more cursory fashion than
with Brunner and Heinecken.

It will be shown, however,

that both the men, and Kantonen in particular, agree to a

great extent with Brunner on the question of religious truth
and its perception.
The historical perspective
Kantonen's viewpoints on religious epistemology, like
Brunner's and Heinecken's, can best be understood iti the
light of the antithesis which he is\ , opposing:

the objective

rationalism of Protestant Orthodoxy.
Luther, Kantonen argues, had opened up the dimension of
the personal correspondence in the God-man relationship:
He CLuther)

stood 11 coram Deo, 11 in the presence of God
never merely speculating or talking about Him but
responding !.Q. Him with his whole being as person to
person. Nor did he petrify God's Word into a system
of abstract concepts. The Word was God himself speaking
to him personally and reaching beyond his intellect into
the innermost depths of his consoience.87

But Orthodoxy, operating with the "static rationalism" ot
traditional Protestant scholasticism, 88 soon removed this
living God-man relationship from the realm of personal
experience into the realm of conceptual analysis.

89

87Taito Almar Kantonen, Resurgence or 1h.!. Gospel
(Philadelphia: The Muhlenberg Press, 1948), P• 36.
881J2.is.. , p. 13 7.
89Ibid., P• 58 •
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It was the misfortune of the Reformation that its
great living truths received their systematic formulation in an age when the basic thought-forms were
supplied by a de~adent Aristotelian Soholasticism.
Consequently the new wine ot the rediscovered Gospel
was poured into the old wineskins of static intelleotualism.90
It might be made clear at this point that this writer is
passing no judgment as to the strict aocuraoy of the above
statement.

Neither Brunner, Heinecken nor Kantonen go to

any great length to supply primary evidence for their claims
of Orthodoxy's so-called distortions of the epistemological
relationship.

It is more or less assumed that in Orthodoxy

a rather sterile intellectualism did replace the more vibrant,
existent i al approach of Luther.

At any rate, it is this

objectiviam, this emphasis upon the precisely defined and
the rati o na l, which Kantonen suggests as one of the chief
obstacles blook i ng the way to a valid theological epistemo-_
logy.
Greek versus Biblical concepts of knowledge
"Truth is not decided by counting noses," says Kantonen.
It cannot be "pinned up and exhibited like dead butterflies."

91

92

It is dynamic, and ita greatest foe is "static intellectualism."93

Kantonen does not often refer to these objectivist

901h!g_., P• 35.

91Taito Almer Kantonen, Lit§. attar Death (Philadelphia:
Muhlenberg Press, 1962), p. 21.
92T. A. Kantonen, Ila. Theo1qgY 52.t Eyanee1ism (Philadelphia:
Muhlenberg Press, 1954), P• 20.
93Kantonen,

R§aureenoe, P• 33.

96
tendencies as being specifically "Greek," but it is clear that
the entire tradition of philosophical, speculative analysis
and reflection is being suggested.
The difference betveen this tradition and the Christian
or Biblical one is the difference between contemplation and
narration.
Christianity is not just another theory of knowledge,
another attempt to discover truth. It never stops
with mystical feeling or philosophical reflection,
in which a man lndulges for his own satisfaction.
It is essentially not contemplation at all, although
contemplation may be used to clarify it, but narration,
an account of what God has done and is doing and what
happens to us when God does His work in us.94
Kantonen is possibly more involved in the practical
mission of the Church than either Brunner or Heinecken.

A

number of the books he has written deal with practical subjects
such as stewardship and evangelism.

Consequently, he often

carries the discussion of the difference betveen Greek and
Biblical thought into the applied situation within the life
of the Church.

He says, "Vital theology, then, like vital

preaching, is never a mere juxtaposition of propositions,
no matter how important or trua."95

With refe r ence to

preaching once more, he writes:
When the Gospel is preached in its original purity
and vigor as the wisdom of God and the power of God,
not as a philosophy of some sort, it continues to
bristle with paradoxes.96
Or, regarding educational principles in the Church's mission,
94Kantonen, Theology

2f Evangelism,

p. 10.

95Reaurgenae, p. 100.
96The Message of the Church 1Q. !h.! World of Today
(Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 194lf;° P• 61.

97
Kantonen observes:
Religious life will continue to be at a low ebb in our
congregations so long as we operate simply on the assumption that vital religion can be taught without stressing
that it has to be caught. It is a fallacious idea,
drawn from Greek philosophy, not from the Christian
Gospel, that oorrect knowledge will automatically
result in right action.97
Paradox, dynamic vitality, involvement--these character=
istica of Biblical thought are thus contrasted with the emphasis upon propositions, rationality and systematic cateohization in the more objective Greek tradition.

Unlike the abstract

speculative nature of Greek thought, Biblical thought is con"This fact Cthe incarnation1

crete and personal, says Kantonen.

give the Christian kerygma at the same time a living personal concreteness which distinguishes it from every form
or speculation • • • • n9S

The Church's message does not

consist of abstract principles, but of the specific and
concrete mighty acts of God in history and experience,99
"The burden of the apostolic witness was not 'God wrote a book'
but 'God sent forth his Son.•nlOO

Kantonen, then, along with

Brunner and Heinecken, but not in as detailed a manner, would
claim a radical difference between the knowledge and import

97Resurgenge, pp. 218-19.
98T. A. Kant onen, "Chriet--the Hope of Those Who are
Outside the Church," Lutheran World, I (Summer, 1954), 114.
99Kanton~n, · J:Se ssage, P• 30.
lOOKantonen, Rgsurgence, P• 107.
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of philosophical, purely rational activity and the knowledge
end import of the Biblical tradition.

Once more, the differ-

ence might be aptly summarized as that existing between kennen

and wiesen as epistemological relationships.
· The subject-object split and beyond
It need only be noted here that Kantonen does not use
the "subject-object" category to develop his position.
Personalism as the key
Kantonen, like Brunner and Heinecken, finds in the
personality construction the key to Biblical truth and its
perception.
the central doctrine of Christianity is personalityconstruotion. That doctrine--and it is . inseparably
connected with the person of Jeaus--is the doctrine
of the Kingdom of God • • • • When ve try to express
the Kingdom in terms of an~thing static, ve get into
paradoxes; the solut~on or these paradoxes lies in
the living, growing, dynamic reality known as personality.101
Whether the personality-structure "solves" the paradoxes
of Biblical truth . or whether it rather displays them for
what they really are--unfathomable mysteries in another
dimension from that of the fact and the thing--is a question
Kantonen would probably answer in favor or the latter alternative.

But it is evident· that h.e, too, sees a direct

analogy between personality and Biblical truth.

lOlKantonen, Message, PP• 112-lJ.

The

99
knowledge of God and His wars is much the same as knowledge
of another person.

"It is a matter of the will," says

Kantonen, "that is, of the whole personality." ~2

Once again, with Kantonen, as with Brunner and Heinecken,
the personality-structure 1a not arbitrarily picked out as the
most apt analogy of knowledge of the Divine.

The most con- .

vincing reason for its use is the person of Christ.

"Unlike

any religion or philosophy, Christianity is inseparably bound
up with the person of its Founder."l03

The living Christ is

the basic determinant of the personal nature of Biblical truth.
"It (faith]

is a person-to-person relation with C~rist, which

dissolves into nothingness unless it is vitalized by recurrent
encounters with its living object."l04
Kantonen most often sets forth this personalistic scheme
of Biblical truth in direct contrast and, this writer holds,

in revction to a more intellectualistic, objectivistio structure.

Some examples are listed:
The God of the Bible does not concern himself with
imparting to m~n a body of facts, and principles
for interpreting them but with establishing personal
fellowship with men.l 65

.

. . . . . .. ... ..... .. . . .. ... .. .
.

l02TheologY tl Evangelism, P• 8.
103Message, p. 52.
l04Resurgence, p. 81.
l05Theologi

21. Evgngei'ism, P• 18.
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The God who became man is not concerned with truths
or principles but with persons • • • • His appeal
therefore does not take the form "Believe my teachings,"
"Follow my precepts," but "Believe in me," "Follow me,"
"lam the truth.nlOo

• • • • • • • • • • • •

•

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

In the person-to-person encounter of faith the believer
takes hold of the Lord himself, not just something said
or written about Him.107
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

In the Christian message it is not an institution or
a book or a body of doctrine that asks for our trust
and obedience but a person who says, 11 I am the truth.
• • • 11108

. .. .. .. .... .... .. ... ... .. .

..

~Jaeusl came not to win assent to a set of propositions but to seek and to eave men.109
The note of reaction is clear; Kantonen is not only presenting
theological parsonalism as the key to understanding the Christian
faith, but is, in so doing, opposing a concurrent theological
thought-system which he feels is misleading and ultimately
false.
Kantonen claims that an appreciation of this personality
construction is first truly realized in a vital awareness of
sin.

"A man becomes aware of God as a person only when he

l06 11 christ--the Hope," ~· ill•, P• 114.
l07aesurgenoe, PP• 109-10.

108A Theology !2.!'. Christian §tevardshiR (Philadelphia:
Muhlenberg Press, 1956); PP• 12-13.
l09Theology .Q.f Evangelism, P• 19.
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has become aware that his will has orossed God's will."llO
Only when man's secret sins have been exposed and his vain
pretensions shattered, can a personal relationship with God
' become possible, says Kantonen, 111

This possibility of

relationship becomes a reality in the forgiveness or sins.

·"A vital personal relationship between man and God thus
comes into existence, but its sole ground and constant pivot
i a the forgiveness of sins." 112

Kantonen thus bases hie

I

peraonaliatic viewpolnt on the thoroughly Lutheran eubstruotur~ of sin and grace.
God as Revealer

"Christian truth, the truth or the gospel, is, · first ot
all, li'lfealad truth.

It :ls baaed on divine self-disclosure. 1111 3

Kantonen, ·too, insists that man's knowledge of God finds its
source and content in God's self-communication.
Subject of the epistemological relationship.
114
cannot find God until God has found him,n

must precede our idea or God. 1111 5

God is

"• •• man
"God himself

'When speaking of such

llOBesurgence, P• 7).
lll4heology f9r Chri§tian ~tewardshlp, P• 29.

112Resurgence, P• 74.

ll3Kantonen, Theology g.!: Evangelism, P• 7.
114Resurgence, p. 97.
115Theolog1 ~ Evangelism, P• 7.

102

divine secrets as the nature of life after death, man's own
surmises and arguments have no part, says Kantonen.

"It

Cthe answer to such a questionl is drawn entirely from God's
revelation of himself • • • • »ll6

Revelation is the basis

of Biblical epistemology.
But this revelation is something much more then a body
of correct propositions or flawless words, Kantonen insists.
The Word is not only the revealer of divine wisdom
but also and primarily tho vehicle of divine power, the power to give vital conviction, to break sinful
habit, to redirect the will, to bridge the chasm between God and man.117
Kantonen emphasizes the "power" inherent in God's aelfdiscloeure.

G-0d's revelation is so much more than truths

to be accepted; it is acting, saving, power-transmitting
truth.
But Christian truth is not only revealed truth, in
which God himself assumes the initiative. It is also
redemptive truth, which shows God to be in saving
action • . It is ~ot a mere communicatio~ of ideas but
a transmission of power. Revelation is inseparable
from salvation.118
Only when the Word of God is received as a personal addressto the individual does this power-instilling communication
ta~e place.

As long as it is received as information about

God or as oodifiable material for doctrines it is powerless
and incomplete.

Kantonen gives a forceful picture of the

116Life after Death, P• 2.
117Resurgenoe, P• 143.
118Theology

£! Evangelism, P• 8.
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living Word and its transforming workings, as opposed to
a lifeless word considered as objective fact, in the following quotation:
The Word is not a collection or ideas to be understood
or a set of rules to be obeyed but the power of a new
life to be received. Its primary appeal is neither to
the intellect nor to the emotions but to the will and
conscience, to man as man. It seeks to take hold of
the total personality and to give not mere information
about God but fellowship with God. It is not a general
"to whom it may concern" but addresses itself, to use
a good Quaker expression, "to our condition.n J It meets,
not men's idle curiosity, but their anxiety, guilt,
despair. It confronts men at the point of their deepest
need. It both discloses and meets our need for a Savior.
It brings to us not only new insight and wisdom on matters
vhich constitute our ultimate concern but an entirely
nev structure of life, the rule of God, the sovereignty
of Christ. ~t not only acquaints us with the sacred
Scriptures but transforms us into living epistles of
Christ.119
The antithesis against which Kantonen is reacting with this --=
dynamic, personal approach to the Word is obvious:

the

biblicistic tendency to over-objectivize and depersonalize
into cold abstractions the living voice of God.
the divine truth does not endure as a static quantum,
possessed ·and hoarded and handed down from one generation to another, but as a series of personal encounters
by which men of each successive generation face God
himself~ hear Hie voice and receive His life-changing _
power.l~O
Kantonen explains that this always contemporaneous
encounter is made effective only through the Spirit of God

119Theoloey ~ Christian atewardship, PP• 15-l.
6
120

Kantonen, Resurgence, P• 126.
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who alone makes known the true significance or the Word. 1 21
Furthermore, Kantonen, together with Heinecken, adds the
Lutheran note that God can be known perhaps most explicitly
in the saoraments. 1 22
The relation of reason to faith and theology
Kantonen calls "Lutheran"--and thus agrees with-Brunner•s position thet man's spiritual nature, even in its
sin-perverted state, still affords a point of contact with
God.« 12 3 Whether Kantonen would have Brunner include the
•
reason in "man's
spiritual nature" is uncertain.

does say this, however, about unregenerate reason:

K~ntonen
"Natural

unregenerate reason not only fails to find God; it also fails
to see in the Gospel anyth3ng but foolish nonsense." 124

At

another place he expands upon this thought:
Human reason can give us an Aristotelian God who sits
in solitary splendor contemplating his own perfection
and refusing to contaminate himself with the imperfections of the world. It cannot give us a God who runs
down the road to embrace one whose associations hsve
been with harlots and swine.125

121

lill•' p.

124.

122lh!g,., p. 109.
123.Ill£., P• 16.
124Ibid., pp. 106-07.

125
Theology

.21: Christian §tewardghip, p. 39.
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Rationalistic theology applies only "high and glorious"
terms to God, says Kantonen, vhereas faith's theology g'r aspa
God even in His masks of weakness, disgrace and suffering. 126
No mere theological analysis will enable man to appreciate
the true meaning or, for example, justification by faith; it
is only when one embarks "on the same venture of personal

faithn

127

that it is truly realized and experienced.

Kantonen does not speak explicitly about the necessity
of reason in either the faith-relationship or in the task
of theology.

His main interest seems to lie in demonstrating

the inadequacy of the reason to independently achieve a vital
relationship with God.

Man, in his perennial state of un-

villingness to "acknowledge his dependence, to accept his
finiteness, to admit his insecurity," 128 seeks a man-made
way of salvation, to be brought about according t~ the selfsufficient dictates of reason.

Kantonen calls this autono-

mous attempt of man naive and impossible.
If our difficulty were only a lack of knovledge or a
weakness of the moral will, we would need only a
teacher or an exemplar. But sin is such a radical
dislocation of our basic relation to God that we need
a Mediator and a Savior.129

126
Resurgence, p. 125.
127

128

129

Ibid., P• 74.
Ibid:•, p .. 27.

Message, pp. 54-55.
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The discussion of Kantonen closes at this point, with
the acknowledgment that his treatment of the epistemological
question is perhaps the most purely theological of the men
studied so far, at least from the Lutheran standpoint.

His

constant attention to such strictly theological issues as
sin and justification and his avoidance of such constructs
as "subject" and nobjectn in connection with the question
or the perception or Biblical truth set him somewhat apart
from the other two.

It has been sufficiently noted, however,

that he is in substantial agreement with them in every important emphasis regarding the question of theological epistemology.

Joseph Sittler
Of the three Lutheran theologians being considered,
Joseph Sittler stands out fpr a number of reasons.

His

thought is possibly the most original of ·the three and the
most poignantly phrased.

While Heinecken concerns himself

primarily with the existentialist approach and Kantonen
with the purely Lutheran theological approach, Sittler's
main interest lies in the area of ecumenics and a contemporary restatement of the Christian faith.
least to say on the subject of this study.

Sittler has the
It oan be seen,

however, that what he does say agrees quite closely with the
thought of the other three men above.

This section will

attempt to point out these areas or basic agreement.
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The historical perspective
Sittler, like the others, sees the period ot Orthodoxi
as the stultification of the dynamic, relational theology
or the Reformers.

Orthodoxy's central tragedy, according

to Sittler, was that it "stultified the Reformer's doctrine
of the Word in definitions aimed at intellectual
acceptance.

. . . 11130

Understanding revelation in a

"propositional, documentary, static, and thoroughly
intellectualized manner,"lJl Orthodoxy attempted, as had
medieval theology before it, 1 3 2 to give man religious
certainty.

But in its search for certainty and safeguards,

it somehow lost track of the core of what it was trying to
protect.
Seeking to enclose the living, orthodoxy stifled.
Seeking to cherish by logically necessary formulations, it squeezed out of the doctrine the decision
of faith. Seeking to tighten theologically, it
reduced religiously. Seeking to protect a heritage
by enclosing it in a box--it mummified.133
Whenever the living, personal truth is thus conceived of in
terms of right teaching,· an explosive reaction is bound to
follov, argues Sittler~

He

points at Pietism aa the

lJOThe Doctrine~ Xhe Word (Philadelphia:
Press,· 1948), p. 44.

1311h!.!!•, P• 48.
l32.Il2isl., P• 13.

1 3
~ .IJu.s.., P• 49.

Muhlenberg

108

"explosion" which followed Orthodoxy.

when the object of faith has been theologically
transmuted into a static identification with a
historic~! document, then. faith, which is always
dynamic, will inevitably shift its attention to an
area in which a dynamic need can be met by a dynamic
object. In this inst~noe CPietismJ, to the
believing individua1.iJ4
The dynamic or the authentic God-man relationship, once
released, "cannot permit theology ever again to operate
as if it had not been," says Sittler. 1 35

The Church always

must and will be on guard against the objeetivization of the
address of the gospel.
Greek versus Biblical concepts of knowledge
"The gospel is not a holy box of divine propositionsranging from simple to complex; it is nothing less than the
organic life of God confronting us nov here, now there.n 1 3 6
With this differentiation between the proposition and the
living, confronting voice of God Sittler sets up the radioal
dichotomy of Greek versus Biblical thought ~

On the surface,

Biblical truth may appear not dissimilar to philosophic truth;

134Ibid., pp. 45-46. (It is this writer's conviction
that this is the precise occasion of each of these four
men's emphasis on the personal, the relational and the nonpropositional; they, too, are reacting, in an almost inevitable direction, against an objectivism and intellectualism within the Church of the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.)
13511A Christology of Function,"
VI (1954), 124.

lli

Lutheran Quarterly,

136Joaeph Sittler, Ill!. Ecology .Q.! Faith (Philadelphia:
Muhlenberg Press, 1961), p. 65.
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but underneath, the two reveal a radically diverse framework
of meaning.

Objective truth can be spoken of in one-level,

undialectical statements; Biblical truth is or necessity
"multipl~-level" in meaning and dialectical.

For the central revelation of God in an Incarnation
of grace in a world of nature inwardly requires that
all discourse inclusive of these two magnitudes is
of necessity dialeotical.137
Sittler thus holds that every simple term of faith must be

set forth in such a way that the multiple dimensions of its
own content are exposed.

Thie interpenetration of the Divine

and the human, of sin and grace, of the old end the new
within religious truth makes for a unique epistemology, an
epistemology which seeks the truo and expresses itself within
the framework of the dialectical.
Sittler emphasizes the fact that the modern age calls
for an epistemology and an apologetic far different from
those of the classical period.

He writes:

It may well be that we are entering upon a period in
the church's life wherein men's minds must be shocked
open to entertain the suspicion that there are realms
of meaning, promise, e.nd judgment vhich ensconce God's
incarnated action for their vague disquietudes.138
Speaking of God in terms

or

substance and ideal essence is

impossible for contemporary man, says Sittler.

"The problem

ot the knowledge of God must, with us, operate with the

137

Ibid., p. 47.

l.38"The Shape of the C.b urch 's Response in Worship,~

The Ecumenical Review, X (January, 1958), 146.
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realities of energy, realizing vill, purposive intention.n1 39
Today man speaks in terms of force and function and not in
terms of objective substance. · .
formulations enunciated in one age are deepeningly
unintelligible in another. The terms of discourse
evoked by and addressed to one historical situation
are no longer deelarative of what they sought to say-a grammar of substance is alien to a gram.mar of function--and are therefore, for the contemporary church,
neither adequate confession nor meaningful piety.140
Sittler sums up the contrast between classical Greekinformed concepts or truth and knowledge and the concepts
operative among contemporary (and among the Biblical writers
and the Reformers as well, he would say) men in this penetrating statement:

the classical Christolcgy of the Greeks perpetuates
formulations whioh operate with a way of speaking
about God vhich is incongruent with our time end its
ways of thinking.
Cla ssical terms were expressive of bodies; ours must
be expressive of functions. Nieaea operated with the
discourse of statics; co~te mporary discourse is permeated through and through vith a world view which
is dynamic. For us, persons are not bodies, but units
or force and will; all things are not bodies, but aims,
means, and creations of these units. The classical
relationshin betYeen bodies was positional; our understanding of.relationship is funotiona1.141
Sittler thus adds this important concept

or

"functionalism"

to the list of differences between the Greek ~nd the Biblical
concepts of truth.

The difference is . once more seen to be

13911A Christology," .Qla•
140Ibid., p. 131.

141~., pp, 122-23.

ill•,

P• 127.
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one of kind and of dimension or meaning, rather than one of
gradation within a singular framework of truth.
The subjact-objeot split and beyond
The paucity of Sittler's remarks with regard to the
inadequacy of the subjeot-objaot process in acquiring knowledge
about God tloes not diminish the impact of his thought in this
area.

Subjeot-objeot epistemology must give way to faith's

own way of knowing whon it comes to Biblical truth,

This ttoommon oentaru and ttglowing core" of Luther's
theology • • • is faith as an independent fbrm of the
apprehension, reception, and actualization of the life
of God. Whenever theology is informed by faith as its
constituent principle an unmistakable dynamism pervades
its every part and method. This is so because when
God is known · by faith, that very way of knoving bestows
a n immediacy of relationship not communicable in subjectobject ways of knowladge.142
Sittler capsules wha.t the other three men under discussion
had been saying, as he says,
What is given in faith is not knowledge about God but
God himself as life, grace, love, and forgiveness- The
vary totality-character of the act of fnith transce~ds
every epistemological analogy whereby a systemization
of it may ba attempted. Faith is an independent form
of God-relationship, and its energies cannot be contained
within categories which would deal with God as an object
of knowledge. For it is the first thing I know about
God when I know hjm in faith that I hed not known him
at all had he not in aggressive love known me into
knowledge of himsalr.14J.

ll~2noctrine .2! the Word, PP• 5-6.

143 Ibid., p. 6.
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This writer would be ha.rd put to find a more apt summary ot
the entire epistemological thrust of the four men being
considered than these two exo~rpts from Joseph Sittler.
Personalism es the key
Here also, what little Sittler hes to say specifically
about the peraonaliatic nature of revelation and divine
truth shows that he is in agreement with Brunner and his
two fellow Lutherans.

Revelation is not a thing--but an action of God, a~
event involving two parties; it is a personal address.
There is no such thjng as revelation-in-itself,
because revelation consists of the fact that something
is revealed to !!llt.144

S1ttler seems to favor the term "dynamic" over "personal"
to convey his concept of a living, relational structure of
Biblical truth and knowledge.

He uses the term "personal"

rarely, perhaps to avoid the pitfalls of secular pereonalism.
It is admitted that the connotations of "dynam1o" and
"pers6nal " are quite diverse.

However, from such statements

as above,145 it is clear that his intention is not to contradict but to rephrase the personalistio oonstruots of the other
three.
God as Revealer

144J;bid., p. 33.
l45See also:

Sittler•s Doctrine

2.1: ~ Word, P• 48.
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Revelation is seen as dynamic and existential divine
self-disclosure by Sittler.
Lutheran theology, with its understanding of
revelation as the Deus Loguens can never equate the
revelat i on with a book, a palpable historical produqt.
Revela t ion ie, rather, the address or God to man, the
incessant self-disclosure of God in his vill and mercy,
in his judgment and appeal. Revelation is not a thing;
it is a continuing activity . It is not static but
dynamic.146
God can be known only because and i~ so far as he reveals
Himselr, 1 47 and, in order that he might truly be known by man,
he must "present himself to man as a God for sinners.n 1 4 8
Gqd and His gospel are first realized in a genuine sense
when man responds to God's call to undeserved fellowship.
Sittler, like both the other Lutherans, insists that
God's self-disclosure is always veiled and open only to the
response of faith.
For, while God wills to reveal himself, he always
reveals himself in a veiled way, in such a relati onship
to the things of earth that man must ask after h i m in
desperate earnestness • • • • It is ultimately of the
mercy of God that he reveals h i mself to me in such a
way that only in faith I may know him.149
God reveals Himself in such veiled ways as, for example, the
cross, argues Sittler, "· •• that through faith he may really
reveal himself, and not merely some information about him-

l46Doctrine 21, the Word, P• ll.

147lh!s,., P• 17.
148Ibii•, p. 7.

l49Ib1d., PP• 63-64.
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self. 11150

The masks of revelations, those indirect means

whioh defy rational apprehension, are t~us part and parcel
of the God-man epistemological relationship.
not in idea , but in cloaked fact.

God comes,

He can be known, not by

ordinary rational endeavor, but only in the response of
faith.

Sittler adds this thought:

When God makes the requirement that who would know
him must know him in faith, he but requires, in the
area of religious knowledge, what is necessary in
accordance with his nature as Agape. That is to
say that the revelation of God, interpreted in terms
of Eros, may be so received as to require no such
radical faith. But God as Agape stands over against
me in so sharp a discontinuity that a lesser personal
coalescence of the whole being than faith as trust is
improper to the nature of the revelation.!'~!'
God's revelation is unique and the reception of this revelation is unique because God as Agape is unique.
have phrased this same thought:

Brunner might

God's revelation is personal

and its reception is personal because God is personal~

The relation 0£ reason to faith and theology
Sittler provides no excursus on this specific subject.
He does say, however, that clarity of doctrine "without the
love of the brother who is luminously before us precisely
152
as the brother is the clarity of damnation."
He would thus

150.I]u.g,., p. 66.
151

Ibid., P• 64.

152 ucalled to Unity," The Eoumenioa,l Review, XIV
(January, 1962), 185.

115
second Brunner•s frequent observation that doctrine tor
doctrine's sake breeds lovelessness. 153

Doctrines are

indeed necessary, aaya Sittler, to meet the exigent challenges
of definite historical threats,154 but the moment these doctrines become the object rather than the expression of faith,
they have ceased to serve their function and have become a
decided distortion of the dynamic, faith-engendered and sustained God-man relationship.
With these remarks Chapter II comes to a close.

The

evidence sup plied in this section is sufficient to support
a olaitn that Martin Heineoken, Taito Kantonen and Joseph
Sittler, although varying on several matters of emphasis
and adding several specifically Lutheran notes to the discussion, substantially agree with the epistemological position of Emil Brunner presented in Chapter I.

153Emil Brunner, The Divine-Human Encounter, translated
by Amandus

w.

Loos (Philadelphia:

The Westminster Press,

1943), p. 103.
15 4ucalled to Unity," .2J2.• cit., P• 185.

CHAPTER III
CONCLUSION
The six fooi oround which Emil Brunner structures his
theological epistemology have, by this time, been oft repeated.
A.

His position can best be understood by investigating

the historical perspective and noting that he is consciously
and intentionally countering what he calls a false objectivism within P~otestant Orthodoxy.
B.

The fallacy of so much of the Orthodox approach is

that it f ollows Greek rather than Biblical thought-patterns,
says Brunner.

The Greek tradition's approach to truth empha-

sizes the abstract, the timeless and universal, the objective,
the fact and the syetematizable; the Biblical approach, on
the other hand, emphasizes the concrete, the historical and
the existential, the personal, the act and the paradoxical.
The key to the Greek pattern is rationality; the key to the
Biblical is personal faith in response to a personal encounter.

c.

Inherent in the Greek epistemology is the subject-

object way of knowing.

Brunner insists that this process is

untrue to Biblical truth, and that only a Subjeot-subject
pattern renders genuine knowledge of God and the God-man
relationship.
D.

The key to theological epistemology is the personal-

istic framework of knowing.
another person.

A man knows God as he knows

All of the abiding mysteries of personality,
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all the relatedness and intimacy of communion, all the nonobjectifiable qualities existing within the close person-toperson relationship, all of the knowledge gained only through
trust and aharing--these enigmatical elements which make up
the epistemological relation between one person and another
hold true in man's epistemological relationship with God who
is personal and who bea_ame a Person in history for man.
E.

God is evermore Subject of this personal epistemolo-

gical relationship.

By ·ais historical and existential reve-

lation and by it alone can man oome to know God.

The Bible

is the means to this self-disclosure.
F.

Human reason, while essential in both the activity

of faith and in theologizing, remains ancillary and subservient to faith's own way of knowing.

The knowledge of faith

(kennen) and the knowledge of reason (wissen) operate in two
different dimensions of truth.

While there are necessarily

objective elements to be knowr- in the God-man epistemological
relationship, yet these objective facts merely inform the
really primary activity:

the trusting and obedient response

or faith to the address of the self-disclosing God.
While several differences in emphasis are noticeable
and while the distinctively Lutheran approach shows up in diverse ways and places in thei~ positions, yet it has been
shown by considerable documentatio.n that the three American
Lutheran theo~ogians, Martin Heineoken, Taito Kantonen and
Joseph Sittler, ar~ in substantial agreement with Brunner in
every one of the six categories listed above.

~here is little
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obvious dependency upon Brunner, 1 but the similarities in
viewpoint do exist, whether derived from Brunner, or from a
possible common souroe such es Soren Kierkegaard or Martin
Buber, or from independent or semi-independent study and
discovery.

These four men are opposing the same antitheses

and are proposing muoh the same answer to the God-man epistemological question.
Whlle the stated purpose of this study is to "present"
Brunner's theological epistemology and that of the three
Lutherans in comparison to it, and not to evaluate or criticize it, still it mi ght be helpful to include at this point
some of the more telling of the criticisms contemporary
theologians are leveling against Brunner's position.
A.

Schrader olaima that Brunner is guilty of both · "bad

theology and bad metaphysics" in his insistence that God is
pure subject.
But when Brunner claims that a subject can never be
known as an object, he is, I think, guilty of a conf'usion. It does not follow from the fact that a subject
cannot gua subject be known as objeot, that a subject
cannot be known as an object. Only if a being were
nure subject would this inference be justified. In
the case of God, of course, this is precisely what
Brunner and others have maintained. And Brunner makes
a similar claim with respect to human subjects •
• • • The fact is that I am both subject and object
and the unity of the two. I can be known objectively

1

There are a few direct references to his writings,
however, and several sufficiently acknowledged appropriations of identical terminology. See Martin J. Heineoken,
The Moment Before God (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press,
1956), p. 240.
----

119
even though my inwardness can be revealed only insofar
as I choose to reveal it through communication. It
would be, I think, just as wrong to be treated as a
pure subject as am.QI.!. objeot.2
Brunner would probably answer this, as is shown in the section
entitled "Relation ot Reason to Faith and Theology,"3 that
there are indeed objective, rational elements in man's knowledge of God.

But to place the primary emphasis upon God as

object in the epistemological relationship is to miss the
really valid way of knowing Him.
B.

With regard to Brunner's personalistic emphasis,

Paul Jewett maintains that Brunner's claim to personal
correspondence as the basic thought-form of the Bible
"cannot be sustained.»4

William Wolf, too, puts the

question as to whether Brunner is not "subjecting the biblical material to a large amount of a priori personalistic
metaphysic.» 5

Paul Tillich says that this personalistic

category is not exclusive enough to really be contributing
significant information about the Divine-human encounter.
He writes:

2 aeorge A. Schrader, 11 Brunner's Conception of Philosophy," in Ill Theolog;y .Q..! !mil Brunner, edited by Charles W.
Kegley (New York: Macmillan Company, 1962), PP• 123-24.
3 supra, pp. 56ff.

4"Ebneria~ Personaliam end its Influence upon Brunner's
Theology," !h§_ Westminster Theological Journal, XIV (May,
1952), · 147.
5"An Outline of Brunnar's Theology," Anglioan
Theological Review, XXX (April, 1948), 132.
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Life in all its dimensions cannot be grasped without
an encounter of the knowing and the known beyond the
subject-object scheme, If this is the case, the
questi on may arise whether the person-to-person
encounter is the only valid analogy to the Divinehuman encounter and whether, therefore, in the
description of the way of knowing God, the per3ona listio categories s hould be used exclusively,6
Robert Bertram claims that if non-theological science would
ever succeed in cleari ng up some of the difficulties of
interpersona l knowledge, this would, according to Brunner's
approach, endanger or at least lessen God's transcendence.
He [Brunner] has fixed upon the general epistemological
dist i ncti on between personal and non-personal knowledge;
and noting the technical difficulties which philosophy
has had in accounting for the former, he ooncludea that
th i s philosophically inexplicable knowledge of persons
is peculiar to divi ne revelation and is the proper
subject matter of Christian theology and ethics. And
from this he has gone on to say, in effect, t hat the
transcendent God is transcendent, at least partly,
because He is a person. (This is certainly different
from saying that God transcends our knowledge somewhat like persons do,)?
I

Thia writer would be interested in hearing Brunner's reply
to this charge that he has started with a general personal'

istic epistemology and then foisted it upon Christian theology.
Concerning the last two sentences of Bertram's charge, Brunner
would no doubt say that he does both:

he sees God as personal

or as a Person (s pecifically in Jesus Christ) and he knows

6

"Some Questions on Brunner's Epistemology," in!!'!.!
Theology of !mil Brunner, edited by Charles W, Kegley (New
York: Macmillan Company, 1962), p. 100,
7

.

"Brunner on Revelation," Concordia
Monthly, XXII (September, 1951), 639°

Theological
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God in a way similar to the way he knows a person.

Both sides

are true to his position.
C.

Schrotenboer 1 s final evaluation of Brunner's posi-

tion reads:
He CBrunner) does not stand apart from the stream ot
modern thought, calling it back to the fountain-head
of truth, namely, the God of the Bibl~, but he is
himself influenced strongly by the Zeitgeist. This
is apparent from bis uncritical acceptance of higher
criticism, his irrationalistic devaluation of theory,
and his construction of the truth of revelation as
personal correspondence.a
Brunner admits to an acceptance of higher critioism,9 but
perhaps not uncritically; he does devaluate theory, but not
irrati onally; 10 he does see Biblical truth as personal
correspondence. 11

Does this necessarily determine that he

is leading avay from the "fountain-head of truth" or that
he is in error holding these positions?
Jewett criticizes Brunner for inadequate Scriptural
proof for his various viewpoints.

For example, he complains

that Brunner cites only two passages 12 to support his major

8

P. G. Schrotenboer, A New Apologetics: !.!l !!:!!.lzsis
Appraisal of 1h..! Eristic Theology Q.! Emil Brunner (Kampen:
J . H. Kok, 1955), p. 216.

~

9

Supra, p. 49.

lOEmil Brunner, Revelation and Reason; !h.!t Christian
Doctrine of Faith !U!.!! Knowledge, translated by Olive Wyon
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, c~ 1946), p. 418.

11

supra, p. 40.

121 Cor. 8:1-3 and Eph. 1:4.
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thesis of personal correspondence as ·~he funda mental category
of Biblical truth. 1 3 This writer woul d have to agree that
Brunner 1 s use of Scripture is sketchy, to aay the least, in
most of his writings.

By what standards one is to judge

adequate Scriptural substantiation for a certain viewpoint
is another question, however.
D.

Schrotenboer furthermore claims that Brunner places

too much stock in human reason.
Brunner requires a subordination of ~eason, but no
reformation of reason. According to his presentation,
reason as t he power of ideation spells autonomy for
man. Such autonomy is not wrong in itself, but becomes
sin 011ly ·when it oversteps its bound'.s .14
Brunner only s peaks of the reason as »autonomous" aa it sets
itself up a s an a bsolute authority over against God, however.15

Autonomous r eason is always sin to Brunner.

Would

not Lutherans agree with him that reason is indeed capable in
the things below and that it errs only when it oversteps its
earthly bounds and attempts to plumb the things above?
Some of the oritioisma against Brunner•s epistemology
are justifiable; others are of questionable weight.

This

writer would add only two questions to the general discussion
concerning Brunner 1 s position:
Is he correct, partially correct or incorrect in his

1 3 Jewett, "Ebnerian Pei•sonalism, 11 .2.E• cit., P• 134.

15Brunner, Revelation and Reason, P• 208.
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disparagement of the presuppositions; methods and conclusions
of Orthodoxy?

If his charges of a distorted theology coming

from this period are valid, doee the fault lie with Orthodoxy
itself, or principally with those two centuries between the
period of Orthodoxy and today?

At any rate, if his accusa-

tions of a false and misleading objectivity and a static
intellectualism leading toward an invalid theological epistemology within Orthodoxy are correct or partially correct,
then it must be remembered, vith all that this implies,
that Lutheran Orthodoxy and its twentieth century descendants
are included in this accusation.
What part, if any, of Brunner•a theological epistemology can be accepted by the Lutheran theologian?

Heinecken,

Kantonen and Sittler agree with most of his major emphases
in this area.

Is the proper stance over against Brunner's

peraonalistic position a judicious and balanced incorporation
of his perceptive contribution to the discussion of the
nature and perception of Biblical truth into a theology
already well-founded, by God's grace, in the objective
truths of the Christian faith?
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